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Expert Information and Expert Evidence:                     
A Preliminary Taxonomy 
Samuel R. Gross∗ & Jennifer L. Mnookin∗∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 speaks in very general terms.  It 
governs every situation in which “scientific, technical or other 
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact,” and provides that, 
in that situation, “a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an 
opinion or otherwise . . . .”1  In 2000, following a trio of Supreme 
Court cases interpreting Rule 702, the Rule was amended to include a 
third requirement, in addition to the helpfulness of the testimony 
and the qualifications of the witness: reliability.  Under Rule 702 as 
amended, a qualified witness may only provide expert testimony “if 
(1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the 
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) 
the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts 
of the case.”2 
In the wake of that trio—Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc.,3 General Electric Co. v. Joiner,4 and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael5—
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 1 FED. R. EVID. 702 (emphasis added). 
 2 Id. (emphasis added). 
 3 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 4 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
 5 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
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we have all tended to focus our attention on the third and most 
recent of these requirements for expert evidence: reliability.  Literally 
thousands of pages have been written about both the proper criteria 
for evaluating the reliability of expert evidence and the institutional 
competence of judges to evaluate scientific reliability.6  Moreover, 
since Rule 702 is a rule of admissibility, commentators write and talk 
about reliability primarily as a threshold question: is the evidence 
reliable enough to be admissible?  That question, naturally, is only 
interesting in cases in which the expert evidence seems to be 
comparatively unreliable—as that term is understood and applied—
and therefore potentially inadmissible.  In each of this trilogy of 
leading cases, for example, the expert evidence at issue was excluded 
at trial as unreliable, and in each case the exclusion was affirmed.7 
Many have suggested that the problem of assessing reliability is 
especially acute with respect to non-scientific expert evidence.8  At 
 
 6 A number of commentators have addressed this issue.  See, e.g., Erica Beecher-
Monas, A Ray of Light for Judges Blinded by Science: Triers of Science and Intellectual Due 
Process, 33 GA. L. REV. 1047 (1999); Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and 
Intellectual Due Process, 107 YALE L.J. 1535 (1998); Judge Harvey Brown, Eight Gates for 
Expert Witnesses, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 743 (1999); Daniel J. Capra, The Daubert Puzzle, 32 
GA. L. REV. 699 (1998); David L. Faigman et al., Check Your Crystal Ball at The 
Courthouse Door, Please: Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present, and Worrying About 
the Future of Scientific Evidence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1799 (1994) [hereinafter Faigman 
et al., Check Your Crystal Ball]; David L. Faigman et al., How Good is Good Enough?: 
Expert Evidence under Daubert and Kumho, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 645 (2000) 
[hereinafter Faigman et al., How Good is Good Enough]; Edward J. Imwinkelried, 
Should the Courts Incorporate a Best Evidence Ruling into the Standard Determining the 
Admissibility of Scientific Testimony?: Enough Is Enough Even When It Is Not the Best, 50 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 19 (1999); Developments in the Law—Confronting the New Challenges 
of Scientific Evidence, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1481 (1994). 
 7 See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 158 (upholding trial court’s exclusion of plaintiff’s 
tire safety expert as unreliable); Joiner, 522 U.S. at 143 (finding trial court’s exclusion 
of plaintiff’s expert evidence on causation within judge’s discretion); Daubert, 509 
U.S. at 583-84 (vacating the lower court’s exclusion of plaintiff’s expert evidence and 
establishing that “general acceptance” is no longer the proper standard for 
admissibility); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1322 (9th Cir. 
1995) (excluding plaintiff’s expert testimony on causation on remand from Supreme 
Court). 
 8 Daubert offers a flexible set of guidelines for judges to examine when assessing 
the reliability of scientific expert evidence—testability, error rate, the existence of 
standards, peer review—and general acceptance.  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-95.  Kumho 
Tire holds that a judge may consider these criteria when evaluating nonscientific 
expert evidence, but emphasizes that this “list of specific factors neither necessarily 
nor exclusively applies to all experts or in every case.”  Kumho, 526 U.S. at 141.  While 
granting the trial judge “considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case how to 
go about determining whether particular expert testimony is reliable,” the opinion 
offers no concrete guidance on how to do this apart from using the Daubert factors 
beyond noting that in some cases, “the relevant reliability concerns may focus upon 
personal knowledge or experience.”  Id. at 150, 152.  A number of commentators 
have begun to address the issue of how to evaluate non-scientific expert evidence.  
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least compared to alternative forms of knowledge-production, 
research science involves formalized methodological norms, 
articulated standards, and conscious research design.  By contrast, 
many forms of potential expert knowledge—from the clinical 
doctor’s diagnosis to the historian’s description to the tire safety 
expert’s analysis—are based on experience, tacit knowledge, even 
hunch.9  Evaluating the reliability of knowledge not produced 
through formal methods thus raises especially difficult questions.  As 
important as an examination of method, however, and much less 
noted, is another dimension: the degree of certainty that the expert 
posits in what she offers.  One of the central problems with much 
expert testimony introduced in court—both scientific and non-
scientific alike—is that experts claim as matters of fact or probability 
opinions that should be couched in more cautious terms, as 
possibilities or hypotheses. 
We believe that the monocular focus on issues of scientific 
method and reliability has obscured some broader points; therefore, 
in this Article we try to step back (gingerly) and take a broader view.  
Instead of beginning with the problems of reliability, we start by 
briefly detailing the array of informational issues facing a consumer 
of expert evidence, thereby putting the attention-getting problems of 
reliability into a broader context.  We then attempt to review and 
classify the full range of expert testimony, much of which is 
unproblematic, AND some of which is problematic but routinely 
admissible nonetheless.  We offer first a brief taxonomy, an outline 
with examples.  We then develop our classification scheme by 
exploring each kind of expert statement in more detail.  In these 
discussions, we purposefully do not distinguish between scientific 
knowledge and other forms of knowledge, instead framing our 
 
See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, Evaluating the Reliability of Nonscientific Expert 
Testimony: A Partial Answer to the Questions Left Unresolved by Kumho Tire Co. v. 
Carmichael, 52 ME. L. REV. 19 (2000); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Next Step After 
Daubert: Developing a Similarly Epistemological Approach to Ensuring the Reliability of Non-
Scientific Testimony, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2271, 2292-94 (1994); D. Michael Risinger, 
Defining the “Task at Hand”: Non-Science Forensic Science After Kumho Tire Co. v. 
Carmichael, 57 WASH. & LEE  L. REV. 767 (2000); D. Michael Risinger, Preliminary 
Thoughts on a Functional Taxonomy of Expertise for the Post-Kumho World, 31 SETON HALL 
L. REV. 508 (2000) [hereinafter Risinger, Preliminary Thoughts]. 
 9 Tacit knowledge and experience matter within science as well.  See, e.g., H.M. 
Collins, The TEA Set: Tacit Knowledge and Scientific Networks, in THE SCIENCE STUDIES 
READER 95 (Mario Biagioli ed., 1999).  In addition, some have argued that Daubert’s 
conception of science is unrealistic and idealized.  See, e.g., David S. Caudill, 
Ethnography and the Idealized Accounts of Science in Law, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 269 
(2002).  Even granting both of these points, developing criteria for evaluating 
reliability remains at least as difficult for nonscientific expert evidence as it is for 
scientific expert evidence, and perhaps more so. 
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taxonomy around specific kinds of statements and their functions. 
Our taxonomy has four purposes.  First, we want to emphasize 
the extraordinary range of information that is presented in court by 
expert witnesses. Some of this information is ‘scientific’ and some of 
it is ‘non-scientific’; but often, whichever categories it falls in, it is 
wholly unproblematic.  Many if not most expert witnesses testify 
without objection and present information that may be critical for 
the factfinder but is not in dispute.  Second, for many categories of 
expert evidence, even when there may be some degree of controversy 
or disagreement, there really is no Daubert or Kumho Tire problem.  
For certain categories of expert information, a focus on the 
credentials of the expert is generally sufficient, and courts need not 
(and typically do not) make any additional elaborate inquiry into 
validity.  Third, our taxonomy reminds us of the continuing 
importance within the evaluation of expert testimony of more 
mundane credibility issues than ‘reliability’ in the Daubert sense: 
specifically, bias, competence, and lack of clarity.  Finally, our 
discussion reveals the sometimes overlooked importance of paying 
attention not only to what the expert says, but to how she says it.  
Often, whether testimony is based on scientific study or more casual 
forms of observation, what makes an expert’s conclusion unreliable is 
that it is expressed with a confidence not warranted by the evidence.  
The clinical observations of a physician or an engineer or a mechanic 
or a fingerprint examiner may be quite appropriate as the basis for 
testimony, but the degree of certainty expressed by the witness should 
reflect both knowledge and its limits, both what is known and what is 
not. 
II.  THE GENERAL NATURE OF EXPERT EVIDENCE 
A.  The Task of Providing Expert Information: Doing and Telling 
“Expert evidence” is a species of the genus “expert information.”  
In everyday life, we rely on experts constantly—doctors, lawyers, 
carpenters, mechanics.  Most of the time we want them to do 
things—set bones, write wills, build walls, fix brakes—not talk about 
them.  Most of us have learned the hard way that mechanics and 
contractors (if not doctors) may have pleasing personalities and give 
clear, plausible explanations, but do lousy work.  Still, we usually want 
these experts to tell us what they are doing, even if that is not their 
main task, and sometimes that information is crucial since we, the 
non-expert consumers, must make critical decisions.  It is that 
informative function that interests us here, since expert witnesses only 
provide information, evidence; what they do in court is tell. 
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Sometimes an expert might be able to answer a question 
immediately, from existing knowledge: “Anthrax is a life-threatening 
bacterial disease that cannot be transmitted directly from one 
infected person to another.”  For other questions, she may need to 
collect additional information, in one or both of two categories: (1) 
data about the particular case, ranging from the minimal (“let me take a 
quick look”) to the extensive (collecting archival data on hiring and 
compensation in a large company and then running a set of statistical 
analyses); (2) general knowledge on the topic, which can mean anything 
from checking a standard reference to an original scientific study that 
adds to the body of general knowledge in the field and may have 
value beyond the lawsuit.  Whatever the scope of the work, the 
structural significance is the same: The telling part of an expert’s 
task—for an expert witness, this is the only job—often requires some 
preliminary doing: study.10 
Testimony based on deliberate study is not the exclusive 
preserve of expert witnesses.  Lay investigators who set out to discover 
what happened on a particular occasion may also testify to some of 
what they find out.  This category includes not only the prototypical 
police and private investigators, but also any other witnesses—most 
often, parties or their employees—who deliberately collect 
information about significant past events.  What makes studies by 
expert witnesses different is the permissible scope of testimony 
describing those studies.  The lay investigator who “solves” a murder 
may testify about the tracks he saw in the dust and the shell casings he 
found in the defendant’s car, but he may not relate most of the 
hearsay statements he heard when conducting interviews, and he may 
not give his own interpretation of the evidence.  By contrast, the 
pathologist who testifies to the cause of death may freely rely on a 
wide range of second-hand information in making up her mind, may 
testify in detail to her opinions, and may be permitted to describe a 
wide range of otherwise inadmissible evidence along the way.11  
 
 10 In-court experiments provide the limiting case.  While it may look like a form 
of “doing,” such an experiment is really a form of “telling” that is gussied up to look 
like “doing.”  No experienced attorney would want an expert to perform an 
“experiment” in court without being quite certain in advance about the outcome.  
Strictly speaking, this sort of performance is not an experiment but a 
“demonstration.”  Its purpose is not to teach the expert anything at all, but to display 
to the factfinder what the expert already knows. 
 11 See FED. R. EVID. 703.  Rule 703 permits experts to base their opinions on facts 
and data not admissible in evidence, so long as they are “of a type reasonably relied 
upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the 
subject . . . .”  An amendment to the Rule in 2000 restricts the extent to which the 
expert may testify to the bases for her conclusions when those bases are inadmissible.  
Such disclosure is permitted only when its probative value “substantially outweighs” 
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Unlike a lay investigator, an expert may generate and testify to new 
information that did not exist before by conducting tests (or 
occasionally even studies) herself. 
B.  Issues for Consumers of Expert Information: Validity, Competence, 
Clarity, and Bias 
1.  Validity 
The most basic question about expert information is whether it 
is within a valid category of expertise: Is there a field of knowledge 
that has credible tools to produce valid answers to questions such as 
this?  Can astrologers determine personality characteristics from the 
time and place of a person’s birth?  Can forensic scientists determine 
a person’s identity from bite marks?  Can biologists determine 
identity from analysis of DNA?  In each case, the issue is not the 
competence of the particular analysis but the legitimacy of the 
discipline’s claim to be able to provide this sort of information.  This 
aspect of validity—field validity—is fundamental but usually 
uncontroversial.  It is important in court because it defines the 
boundaries of permissible expert testimony—biologists will be 
allowed to testify but astrologers will not—but most evidence that is 
offered is well within the recognized borders.  The debates preceding 
and following Daubert have highlighted the importance of field 
validity, and several accepted forms of expert testimony—from 
psychiatric evaluations to handwriting identification—have been 
challenged on this basis.12 
 
its prejudicial effect.  Id.  However, given the existence of hearsay exceptions for 
statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment in Rule 803(4), 
and for statements in learned treatises in Rule 803(18), it is clear that quite apart 
from the limited admissibility now available under Rule 703, experts may still inform 
the jury about a great many hearsay sources for their judgments. 
 12 See, e.g., United States v. Vallejo, No. 99-50762, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 7367, at 
*29 (9th Cir. Jan. 16, 2001) (reversing the district court on its admission of expert 
testimony on drug trafficking and its exclusion of expert testimony by defendant’s 
school psychologist); Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287, 1295 (8th Cir. 
1997) (reversing a successful trial level Daubert challenge to plaintiff’s psychiatric 
testimony); United States v. Powers, 59 F.3d 1460 (4th Cir. 1995) (affirming district 
court’s exclusion of expert testimony that defendant did not exhibit characteristics 
of fixated pedophilia); United States v. Falcon, 245 F. Supp. 1239 (D. Fla. 2003) 
(excluding defendant’s proffer of psychological expert testimony on the personality 
disorders of a key government witness).  The first case to scrutinize handwriting 
identification evidence with care was United States v. Starzecpyzal, 880 F. Supp. 1027 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995), in which the court thought the expertise failed Daubert but admitted 
it anyway as nonscientific expert evidence (a move now prohibited by Kumho Tire).  
Some recent cases have rejected handwriting identification expertise.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Brewer, No. 01 CR 892, 2002 WL 596365 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 2002); 
United States v. Lewis, 220 F. Supp. 2d 548 (S.D.W. Va. 2002); United States v. 
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Moving down a level of abstraction takes us to a second aspect of 
validity: method validity.  Given that a discipline is accepted as a 
legitimate category of expertise on a particular topic, are the 
methods that were used in this instance capable of producing valid 
answers?  The present version of Rule 702, codifying Daubert and 
Kumho Tire, makes method validity a prerequisite for expert evidence: 
expert testimony is only admissible if it is “the product of reliable 
principles and methods.”13  In Daubert itself, for example, no one 
doubted the field validity of epidemiology, but the lower courts went 
on to hold nonetheless that the particular method used by the 
plaintiff’s experts—reanalysis of data from published studies—was 
not a valid basis for testimony by qualified epidemiologists.14  Method 
validity addresses the specific techniques deployed by the expert: Is 
PCR a valid procedure for comparing samples of DNA?  Is differential 
diagnosis a valid method to determine the cause of a disease?  
Daubert, Kumho Tire, and Joiner all concern method validity.15  In their 
wake, objections on this basis have become more common and more 
successful, particularly so in civil cases.16  In run-of-the-mill cases, 
however, expert evidence continues to follow well-worn and well-
 
Saelee, 162 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (D. Alaska 2001).  Academic debate about handwriting 
identification evidence has been similarly vigorous.  See, e.g., D. Michael Risinger et 
al., Brave New ‘Post-Daubert World’—A Reply to Professor Moenssens, 29 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 405 (1998); D. Michael Risinger et al., Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational 
Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting Identification ‘Expertise’, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 731 
(1989); D. Michael Risinger & Michael J. Saks, Science and Nonscience in the Courts: 
Daubert Meets Handwriting Identification Expertise, 82 IOWA L. REV. 21 (1996); see also 
Andre A. Moenssens, Handwriting Identification Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 66 
UMKC L. REV. 251 (1997).  See generally Jennifer L. Mnookin, Scripting Expertise: The 
History of Handwriting Identification Evidence and the Judicial Construction of Reliability, 87 
VA. L. REV. 1723 (2001) (providing a history of handwriting identification). 
 13 FED. R. EVID. 702 (emphasis added). 
 14 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 576 (S.D. Cal. 1989), 
aff’d, 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 15 Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Daubert, 509 U.S. 
579 (1993). 
 16 See MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON ET AL., EXPERT TESTIMONY IN FEDERAL CIVIL 
TRIALS: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS (2000) (finding in a 1998 survey of federal judges 
that fewer judges permitted all proffered expert evidence in their last civil trial than 
had done so in 1991); Lloyd Dixon & Brian Gill, Changes in the Standards for Admitting 
Expert Evidence in Federal Civil Cases since the Daubert Decision, 8 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & 
L. 251, 269 (2000) (finding on the basis of an empirical study of district court 
decisions that “since Daubert, judges have examined the reliability of expert evidence 
more closely and have found more evidence unreliable as a result”); see also Lucinda 
M. Finley, Guarding the Gate to the Courthouse: How Trial Judges are Using their Evidentiary 
Screening Role to Remake Tort Causation Rules, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 335 (1999); Steve 
Leben, In Practice, Daubert Raised the Bar, 37 COURT REV. 37 (Fall 2000); Joseph 
Sanders & Julie Machal-Fulks, The Admissibility of Differential Diagnosis Testimony to 
Prove Causation in Toxic Tort Cases: The Interplay of Adjective and Substantive Law, 64 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 107 (2001). 
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accepted paths.17 
Method validity and field validity are obviously linked—a field is 
invalid to the extent that its methods fail to do what they claim—but 
the distinction is important.  Field invalidity implies method 
invalidity, but the converse is not the case.  Few question the value of 
medicine as a field, and few doubt that some medical doctors make 
foolish medical claims, based on unsound, if not specious, methods.  
One of the most difficult tasks for lay judges in evaluating expert 
evidence is to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable 
practices by qualified members of a legitimate discipline.  One 
solution is to pass the buck back to the expert field itself, and accept 
the standards it imposes on itself; this is the logic behind the Frye 
standard of “general acceptance” for novel scientific techniques.18  
However (ignoring for the moment other difficulties with Frye), this 
dodge does not work when the validity of the field itself is in 
question.19 
2.  Competence 
Assuming that expert information reflects sufficiently valid 
methods within a legitimate field, we need to know whether a 
particular statement is a competent example of its genre.  This issue 
has two components: (1) Qualifications: Does the expert at hand have 
the knowledge and skill that are necessary to produce the 
information?  Rule 702 makes this a requirement: to testify as an 
expert, a witness must be “qualified . . . by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education . . .”;20 and (2) Execution: Did the 
expert (assuming she can ever do so) perform competently on this 
occasion?  Even a qualified expert working in a recognized and valid 
 
 17 The empirical data on the effects of Daubert are limited, but some findings 
about how judges perceive Daubert are suggestive.  See JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 16 
(stating that though the number decreased between the years 1991 to 1998, in 1998, 
59 percent of judges still allowed all of the expert evidence proffered in their last 
civil trial); Sophia I. Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey of Judges 
on Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 433 (finding 
in a 1998 survey of state trial court judges that 59 percent thought that the intent of 
Daubert was either not to change the threshold for admissibility for expert testimony, 
or to lower it). 
 18 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 19 On Frye in general, see Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific 
Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (1980) 
(describing some of the problems with the Frye test).  For analysis of the problems 
with a general acceptance test when the field itself may be invalid, see Jennifer L. 
Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence in an Age of DNA Profiling, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 13, 63 
(2001).  See also Michael J. Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law’s Formative 
Encounters with Forensic Identification Science, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1069, 1078-79 (1998). 
 20 FED. R. EVID. 702 (emphasis added). 
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methodology can do an incompetent job in a particular case.  Rule 
702, following Kumho Tire,21 requires that expert testimony be “based 
upon sufficient facts or data,” and that the expert have “applied the 
principles and methods [she used] reliably to the facts of the case.”22  
Until recently, American courts were notoriously forgiving on 
qualifications, and probably almost equally so on execution, as 
preconditions for admissibility.  The operating theory was that in 
most cases these are issues that go to the weight of the evidence.  
There are some indications that courts have become more exacting 
in recent years, though the cases are by no means consistent on this 
point. 
3.  Clarity 
You can only make use of information to the extent that you 
understand it.  When the informant is an expert—someone whose 
career is devoted to arcane information—the problem can be acute, 
as most of us know from common experiences with builders, 
accountants and computer technicians.  Clarity is not generally an 
important factor in determining the admissibility of expert testimony 
in court.  In theory, lack of clarity could be a basis for an objection to 
expert evidence under Rule 403 because its “tendency to confuse” 
substantially outweighs its probative value,23or under Rule 702 on the 
ground that the evidence is too confusing to “assist” the trier of fact.24  
In practice, these objections are unlikely to succeed—or even to be 
made.  Because clarity seems to have great influence on the 
evaluation of experts by juries and judges, we are generally willing to 
rely on the self-interest of the parties to produce clear expert 
evidence in court.  In fact, a special danger associated with expert 
testimony is that the parties and their experts will sacrifice accuracy 
for the sake of appealingly clear but erroneous or over-simplified 
presentations.25 
4.  Bias 
If we understand what an expert tells us, and know that she has 
correctly applied a valid method to the pertinent facts, our problems 
are at an end.  In most situations, however, we cannot know these 
things directly for the simple and obvious reason that we ourselves 
are not experts in the relevant field.  Instead, we use various indirect 
 
 21 526 U.S. at 141. 
 22 FED. R. EVID. 702 (emphasis added). 
 23 FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 24 FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 25 See Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113, 1163-65. 
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measures of the quality of expert information, of which the most 
pervasive, in court and out, is bias.  What is the first question that 
comes to mind when a mechanic at a highway road stop tells you that 
you need two new tires, immediately?  As with clarity, bias is not a 
common basis for excluding expert testimony.  In our system, the 
evaluation of bias is a core function and special prerogative of juries 
as triers of fact; therefore we do not exclude witnesses who may be 
biased, but allow juries to weigh that factor in judging their evidence.  
Our practice for experts is, in this respect, basically the same as for lay 
witnesses.  We systematically neglect well-considered plans for the use 
of unbiased (or at least, non-partisan) expert testimony as a 
supplement to potentially biased party-sponsored expert evidence.26 
Conceptually, bias has three components: (1) Is the field biased?  
Do chiropractors, as a group, always say that the problem is a 
misalignment of the spinal column?  This is not a common issue.  In 
an extreme case, evidence of this sort could conceivably be the basis 
for an objection that evidence from such an expert is invalid—in the 
terminology of this Article, that the area of knowledge lacks field 
validity—or that experts trained in that discipline are unqualified to 
testify.  (2) Is this person biased across a range of cases?  Is she an 
expert who always says that the plaintiff had a pre-existing condition, 
or that toxic exposure caused the disease?  In extreme cases, this 
could be an argument against admissibility on the theory that the 
expert is unqualified; in practice this argument almost always “goes to 
the weight” of the expert’s evidence.  (3) Is the expert’s performance 
biased?  Does the expert have a grudge against this defendant, or, 
more likely, was she paid a handsome fee to say what she said in this 
case?  That too is a type of bias that is considered appropriate as a 
basis for discounting an expert’s evidence, but not for excluding it. 
* * * 
At this point, a note about vocabulary is in order.  Daubert and 
Rule 702 talk extensively about “reliability.”27  In the sciences, 
reliability is often used to mean “consistency” or “repeatability.”28  A 
test that produces the same result on successive applications is said to 
be reliable, while a test that produces accurate results is said to be 
valid.29  The Court in Daubert uses “reliability” instead to mean 
 
 26 Id. at 1187-1208 (describing both benefits and obstacles to use of neutral 
experts). 
 27 See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text. 
 28 David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in REFERENCE 
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 83, 102 (2d ed. 2000). 
 29 Id. 
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something closer to “validity” or “trustworthiness.”30  What the Daubert 
Court calls “reliability” blends our categories of validity and 
competence, focusing especially on method validity and competence of 
execution.  To be consistent with Daubert and Rule 702, in this Article 
we too use reliability to mean “trustworthiness”: If evidence is reliable, 
we can trust it, we can rely on it. 
III.  A TAXONOMY OF EXPERT INFORMATION 
When an expert’s job is to inform, what sort of information do 
we want?  The scheme that follows is a first cut.  The categories we list 
are not entirely analytically distinct, and a single expert will typically 
do more than one of these tasks in a given project.  We do not divide 
expert testimony by field, or even by methodological approach.  Our 
point, rather, is to note that there are several different types of 
information that we commonly seek from experts—in court and 
out—and to try to describe that range.  In the scheme that follows, 
categories of expert information are arranged, more or less, along a 
rough continuum from specific “factual” bricks that the consumer 
may use to build a wall, to comprehensive general “conclusions” that 
the lay listener must accept or reject as a whole.  We start with a 
capsule form of the taxonomy—an outline with examples—and 
proceed to a more detailed discussion in which we try apply the 
general issues we have touched on—validity, competence, clarity, and 
bias—and consider the factors that bear on the admissibility of such 
expert information in court. 
 
 30 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.9 (“We note that scientists typically distinguish 
between ‘validity’ (does the principle support what it purports to show?) and 
‘reliability’ (does application of the principle produce consistent results?) . . . . [O]ur 
reference here is to evidentiary reliability—that is, trustworthiness.”) (emphasis in 
original) (citations omitted). 
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A.  Capsule Form 
 
 
1. Description: 
 
 
 
 
(a) Observation: 
 
“The brake shoes are worn to within 1  
mm of the bracket.” 
“This x-ray shows multiple fractures of  
the tibia.” 
 
(b) Translation: 
 
“In English, that means ‘I agree.’” 
“As used in this stock exchange,  
‘5p@36’ means ‘I offer to sell 5000  
shares of preferred stock at $36 per  
share.’” 
“The term ‘nick’ refers to a five dollar  
bag of cocaine or crack.” 
 
(c) Calculation: 
 
“The total payments over the 10  
year term of the loan, with compound  
interest at 7% per annum, will come to  
$789,566.” 
“A racial disparity this large or larger  
would occur by chance alone less often  
than 1 time in 100,000.” 
“Total indebtedness, as of 9/10/2001,  
was $2,896,755.” 
 
2.  Instruction: 
 
 
 
 
(a) Facts: 
 
“Blood has a pH value of 7.4.” 
“Mitochondrial DNA is transmitted  
entirely from a mother to her offspring.” 
“Most of the loss of eyewitness memory  
occurs in the first few hours after an 
observation.” 
“Bendectin is not a teratogen.” 
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    (b) Norms: 
 
“The customary treatment for  
premature labor is bed rest and a  
tocolytic agent.” 
“Epidemiological study is the most  
persuasive way to establish a correlation  
between ingestion of a substance and a  
disease.” 
   3.  Assessment: 
 
 
 
    (a) Condition: 
          (diagnosis) 
 
“Your chimney is unsafe.” 
“The patient is suffering from  
rheumatoid arthritis.” 
 
 
    (b) Causation: 
 
“The skull fracture may have been  
caused by a blow from a heavy object.” 
“Tire failure was probably caused by a  
defect in the fabrication of the tire.” 
“The tumor was caused by exposure to  
dioxin.” 
 
   (c) Consequences: 
            (prognosis) 
 
“The patient will be permanently  
paralyzed from the fifth lumbar vertebra  
down.” 
“If current levels of phosphates are  
maintained, all frog populations in the  
basin will be extinct within ten years.” 
“You need a new chimney.” 
 
    (d) Identity: 
          (common source) 
 
“The latent fingerprints on the knife  
came from the defendant’s right hand.” 
“It’s a forgery.” 
 
    (e) Value: 
          (or quality) 
 
“The present value of the plaintiff’s  
expected lifetime earnings before  
the accident was approximately  
$1.6 million.” 
“This house has market value between  
$375,000 and $405,000.” 
“This play has literary merit.” 
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B.  Fuller Discussion 
1.  Description 
Much information from experts is primarily descriptive rather 
than evaluative.  Expert testimony focuses heavily on opinions, 
sometimes elaborate opinions, but, as Rule 702 recognizes, experts 
may testify “otherwise.”31  The boundary between description and 
assessment is fuzzy, and expert opinions are frequently, perhaps 
invariably, built into the foundations of their descriptive statements.  
All the same, the distinction is meaningful and useful.  In this Article 
we discuss three types of descriptive statements: observation, 
translation, and calculation. 
Field validity is not a major concern for evaluating expert 
information that is primarily descriptive, although it could be.  A 
specialty that claims to be able to observe people’s thoughts would 
run into deep trouble.  Questions of method validity frequently figure 
in the background—in decisions on what to look for, for example (X-
ray the neck, or the entire spine?), or what to calculate (Is chi-square 
an appropriate statistic test of the independence of the distributions 
of two variables?), or how to calculate it (Can one use the SAS 
statistical package to compute chi-squares?).  And competence, of 
course, is crucial. 
(a)  Observation 
Much of what experts learn to do is see and hear things that the 
rest of us miss.  The degree and nature of the skill involved varies 
greatly from one type of expertise to another, but the advantages that 
many experts have in perception are well known, from umpires 
(good ones) and coaches, to orchestra conductors, to optometrists.  
An expert’s observation may be uncontroversial—the expertise 
involved may consist entirely of identifying the right object (brake 
shoe) and measuring it with the right tool (a caliper)—or it might 
depend on an exercise of judgment that other experts might dispute 
(“Strike!”).  One way or another, the question that this sort of 
expertise answers is: “What did you perceive—see, hear, feel or 
smell?”  In court, expert observations—describing pathologies or 
injuries to people for example, or damage to structures—are often 
crucial, either as the crux of expert testimony or as part of the 
foundation for evaluative opinions.  And these observations are 
sometimes controversial since experts, like everybody else, may 
disagree about what they see. 
 
 31 FED. R. EVID. 702. 
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The distinction between observation and assessment is one of 
degree.  The nurse who says that a patient’s blood pressure was 
135/85 is interpreting sensory information—what she saw on the 
pressure gauge and heard on her stethoscope—not reporting it.  
Moreover, her interpretation incorporates a host of unstated 
assumptions about the tools she used and the procedure she 
followed.  A doctor who says that a patient is suffering from 
rheumatoid arthritis is also interpreting information, but the range of 
information is likely to be greater (multiple tests, reported and 
observed symptoms, family history) and much of it probably consists 
of second- and third-hand accounts.  We classify the first statement 
(blood pressure) as an expert observation, the second (arthritis) as an 
assessment.  Some cases may be harder to call, but the dividing line is 
less important than the underlying issue: To what extent does the 
expert integrate information about the particular case from a variety 
of sources, rely on reports from others, and make complex analytic 
judgments? 
In general, the first thing we want to know about an expert 
observation is the competence of the observer: How good is she at 
this task?  Since we do not usually have direct measures of skill, we 
tend to rely on proxies: How good was her training?  Does she use 
accepted techniques in an apparently competent manner?  Out of 
court, we try to use experts who have, in our own experience, 
provided accurate information in the past; failing that, we look for 
those who are said to be accurate by friends and acquaintances, or 
who are reputed to be accurate.  In court, we count on testimony on 
qualifications and on cross-examination to provide evidence on the 
expert’s training and experience.32 
Bias, of course, may be as important as competence.  The 
chimney sweeper who tells you (as they all do) that there are ten-inch 
cracks in your chimney, is probably also a contractor who rebuilds 
chimneys.  The key to minimizing bias, out of court, is to remove the 
incentives to distort—for example, by consulting a diagnostician who 
knows he will have no role in the treatment.  In court, we neglect the 
most effective method of minimizing bias—using non-partisan 
experts—and rely instead on cross-examination and rebuttal to 
expose it.33 
The primary foundational requirement for the admission of 
observational expertise under existing rules is evidence that the 
expert is “qualified,” which bears on her competence.  On this issue, 
 
 32 See generally Gross, supra note 25, at 1158-62. 
 33 See id. at 1165-76, 1187-1211. 
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the treatment of different sorts of experts is likely to diverge.  If the 
field has elaborate formal qualifications—in particular, if it requires 
graduate or professional education, and/or certification—courts 
typically accept these formal qualifications as sufficient evidence of 
competence.34  Most, perhaps all scientists fall into this category, 
along with many non-scientists.  On the other hand, if the skill is 
based primarily or exclusively on “experience”—the harbor pilot or 
the chicken sexer—courts may demand concrete evidence from past 
practice that the expert can perform this task accurately.35 
By far the most effective way to minimize the danger of error in 
observational evidence of any sort is to reproduce the observation.  
For lay witnesses, we rarely have that luxury; for experts, we can often 
ask another expert to do it again.  If it matters enough, we have a 
second doctor examine the X-rays, or a second lab repeat the test.  In 
litigation, this task may be performed by an expert for the side 
opposed to the party that called the first expert.  When this is 
possible, the adversarial system probably performs quite well, on the 
whole, in producing high quality evidence—provided that the 
advocates for both sides have sufficient resources and motivation to 
do a good job.  This is a significant qualification.36 
The worst problems with expert descriptions occur in criminal 
prosecutions.  Most experts in criminal cases are state employees who 
are called by prosecutors: police officers, medical examiners, 
technicians at state crime laboratories, and so forth.  Many of them 
are inadequately trained, and some are unscrupulous.  Their 
testimony is rarely subjected to review by defense experts; in many 
 
 34 See id. at 1158 n.139 (citing sources). 
 35 Some scholars have suggested that courts have implicitly used a ‘marketplace 
test,’ inquiring whether the expert could make a living selling his professed 
expertise.  See Faigman et al., Check Your Crystal Ball, supra note 6, at 1803-05; Saks, 
supra note 19, at 1073-74. 
 36 Thus, for example, there are reports of widespread expert fraud in 
comparatively small personal injury cases that settle on the basis of written reports 
from plaintiffs’ experts, with minimal review from the defendants’ insurance 
companies, and very likely none from their lawyers.  See, e.g., William K. Rashbaum, 
Three Officers Faked Reports, Police Say, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2002, at B1 (recounting that 
three police officers were charged with falsifying accident reports along with several 
other members of a fraud ring including individuals making false medical and 
insurance claims); Jerry Urban, Metro Officials Say Fraudulent Injury Claims are Problem, 
HOUS. CHRON., Aug. 11, 1997, at A15.  We suspect that such fraud is far more difficult 
and less common in cases that stand any chance of going to trial.  But see Husband, 
Wife Get 7 Years for Fake-Injury Schemes, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., July 17, 1992, at B5.  
A husband and wife were sentenced after managing to win a $2.5 million malpractice 
settlement and $900,000 in workers’ compensation for a fraudulent injury allegedly 
arising from a back surgery.  Id.  The scam was revealed when the “injured” husband 
was video taped by a private investigator walking his dog and climbing stairs.  Id. 
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cases, they are hardly even cross-examined by the inexperienced, 
overworked, and underpaid court-appointed defense attorneys.  Any 
witness can make avoidable mistakes or lie, but an expert can make a 
career of it.  In recent years we have seen examples of this repeatedly 
in criminal prosecutions across the United States: a pathologist who 
testified to conducting hundreds of autopsies on bodies he never 
touched,37 forensic scientists who made up findings in hundreds of 
cases to suit the police and prosecutors,38 and crime labs that were 
riddled with incompetence.39  We have no way of knowing how 
 
 37 Texas pathologist Ralph Erdmann was eventually convicted of felonies relating 
to autopsies that he botched and falsified.  See, e.g., Richard L. Fricker, Grave Mistakes, 
79 A.B.A. J., Dec. 1993, at 46 (describing Erdmann’s incompetence and quoting a 
police seargent as stating that Erdman treated autopsies as if they were “kindergarten 
classes or show and tell”); Richard L. Fricker, Pathologist’s Plea Adds to Turmoil: 
Discovery of Possibly Hundreds of Faked Autopsies Helps Defense Challenges, 79 A.B.A. J., 
Mar. 1993, at 24 (describing Erdmann’s conviction and quoting attorney appointed 
to investigate him as saying, “[i]f the prosecution theory was that death was caused by 
a Martian death ray, then that was what Dr. Erdmann reported”); Roberto Suro, 
Ripples of a Pathologist’s Misconduct in Graves and Courts of West Texas, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
22, 1992, at 22 (describing intimations of a police cover-up of wrongdoing and 
quoting investigator of Erdmann as saying, “We started digging up bodies and when 
we were seven for seven we decided that in the interests of judicial economy we 
didn’t have to go further to prove that this guy was a liar”). 
 38 The most notorious example is West Virginia serologist Fred Zain, who even 
testified to tests his laboratory laced the equipment to perform.  See generally In re 
Investigation of the W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div., 738 S.E.2d 501, 
503-04 (W. Va. 1993) (describing Zain’s misconduct and developing procedures and 
standards for evaluating cases in which Zain’s testimony helped procure conviction); 
JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION, AND OTHER 
DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 109-17 (2000) (describing in detail Zain’s 
mishandling and creation of scientific evidence); Stephanie Martz, Judge’s Report 
Closes Investigation of Zain, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Feb. 25, 1994, at 1D (reporting that 
Zain was found to have fabricated blood test results in at least thirty-six cases); Sarah 
Webster, Officials Revive Case Against Zain: Another Special Prosecutor Appointed to Pursue 
Case, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Oct. 4, 1996, at 1C (describing incriminating evidence 
against Zain said to include two coworkers who saw Zain fake data in nearly 100 
cases). 
 39 See, e.g., Robert Tanner, Standards, Autonomy Sought for Crime Labs Mishandling of 
Evidence; Mismanagement Cited, SEATTLE TIMES, July 7, 2003, at A1 (summarizing recent 
problems with crime labs).  Oklahoma City forensic scientist Joyce Gilchrist presents 
another recent example.  See, e.g., Memo Says Police Lab Manager Botched Evidence, 
TULSA WORLD, May 2, 2001, at A8; Ed Timms & Diane Jennings, Concern Grows Over 
Use of Flawed Evidence; Chemist’s Case Raises Fears of Problem’s Scope, DALLAS MORNING 
NEWS, May 13, 2001, at A43; Jim Yardley, Inquiry Focuses on Scientist Employed by 
Prosecutors: Chemist Handled 5,000 Oklahoma Cases, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2001, at A14 
(reporting that the Governor of Oklahoma ordered all felony cases in which Gilchrist 
was involved to be re-examined); see also McCarty v. State, 765 P.2d 1215, 1218, 1222 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1988) (reversing and remanding capital conviction on account of 
Gilchrist’s poor lab work).  There was also a year-and-a-half long investigation into 
problems at the FBI crime lab.  See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE 
INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE FBI LABORATORY: AN INVESTIGATION INTO LABORATORY 
PRACTICES AND ALLEGED MISCONDUCT IN EXPLOSIVES-RELATED AND OTHER CASES 
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frequently similar problems go undetected, but by any accounting 
they are by far the worst misuse of expertise in American courts.40  
This is an avoidable scandal.  If we are going to rely on the adversary 
system to guarantee competence and honesty in expert evidence we 
must actually have an adversary process.  When one side is absent, the 
result may be disastrous. 
(b)  Translation 
Almost all expert information involves some form of 
“interpretation.”  A radiologist who describes an X-ray as showing a 
bone fracture is “interpreting” the X-ray; for that matter, a layperson 
who says that the defendant “agreed” with the policeman is 
“interpreting” the words the defendant spoke, or the nod of his head.  
We use “translation” in a narrower sense, to refer to the restatement 
in one system of symbolic communication (in American courts, 
everyday English) of a message that was conveyed in a different 
system of communication.41  In this case, the question for the expert 
is some version of “What did she say?” 
The archetypal “translation” is from one common language into 
another.  This is no doubt the common type of expert translation in 
American courts, but other sorts of translation are also used with 
some regularity.  Perhaps the most controversial is expert evidence, 
generally from a police officer, about the meaning of particular 
words and phrases in some esoteric underworld community, typically 
the world of drug dealers.42  Similar interpretive tasks, however, occur 
in any context in which a comparatively small group of insiders in a 
 
(1997); Richard A. Serrano, Misconduct Allegations Arise in FBI Lab Probe, L.A. TIMES, 
Jan. 30, 1997, at A1.  Most recently, a major scandal has been uncovered at the 
Houston Police Department crime lab.  See, e.g., James Kimberly, Independent Lab 
Probe Given Push; City, County Officials Say Inquiry Would Help Rebuild Faith in System, 
HOUS. CHRON., Apr. 30, 2003, at 21, available at http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/ 
ssistory. mpl/special/crimelab/188958. 
 40 See generally DWYER ET AL., supra note 38; Gary Taylor, Fake Evidence Becomes Real 
Problem, NAT’L L. J., Oct. 9, 1995, at A1.  An even more widespread problem may be 
the biases that result from the close relationship between forensic experts and the 
police and prosecution, and the fact that forensic experts frequently know in 
advance what it is that the investigators hope that they will find.  For a general 
discussion of this issue, see D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho 
Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and 
Suggestion, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2002). 
 41 By contrast, Risinger uses “translation” in a broader sense to describe almost all 
expert evaluations about the facts of the particular case that the trier of fact is asked 
to accept on the basis of the expert’s authority.  See Risinger, Preliminary Thoughts, 
supra note 8 at 518-25. 
 42 See Phylis Skloot Bamberger, The Dangerous Expert Witness, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 
855, 867 (1986). 
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profession or trade develops a specialized jargon for the issues they 
deal with on a regular, repetitive basis: You may need an expert in the 
diamond trade to tell you what a sentence from a diamond trader 
means,43 or a pharmacist to interpret what your internist wrote on a 
prescription form.44  As with expert observation, translation (by the 
expert herself, or by another expert) is frequently a foundational 
element of more evaluative expert testimony even when translation is 
not a central or explicit task. 
The main question for a translator is the same as for an expert 
observer, competence: How good is she at her job?  Other than 
common intelligence, the main requirements for competence are 
proficiency in the two systems of communication that need to be 
made mutually intelligible; a Russian language interpreter in an 
American court must be able to understand and communicate 
effectively in both Russian and English.  In addition, of course, a 
biased translator can distort the message he transmits.  As with expert 
observers, the best check on mistranslation is replication by a second 
translator who is not likely to share the weaknesses and biases of the 
first. 
The Federal Rules of Evidence recognize that translation is a 
form of expert testimony, but nonetheless have a special provision for 
interpreters who perform this function, Rule 604: “An interpreter is 
subject to the provisions of these rules relating to qualification as an 
expert and the administration of an oath or affirmation to make a 
true translation.”45  In practice, this means that interpreters who 
provide evidence (as opposed to those who translate proceedings for 
the benefit of non-English speaking participants) are treated 
schizophrenically, depending on the context.  Live testimony cannot 
proceed if there is a dispute about the meaning of the spoken words.  
Therefore, an interpreter who translates testimony from the witness 
stand—unlike almost every other expert witness in an American 
court—is selected by the judge, preferably from an official list of pre-
 
 43 On the internally-created dispute resolution mechanisms within the diamond 
industry, see Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual 
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992). 
 44 Sometimes obscure shorthand is used by insiders for the specific purpose of 
making their views obscure to outsiders.  For example, in a public defender’s office 
where one of us worked as a student, “WPD” meant “white punk on dope,”—a 
shorthand that facilitated messages, on the outside of file folders, such as: “D—WPD 
V—WPD Will settle.”  Similarly, we’re told that in some car dealerships the code 
“ESO” on a form sent back from a mechanic to a “service representative” means 
“Equipment Superior to Operator”—i.e., “The idiot customer is complaining 
because he’s too stupid to operate the machine.” 
 45 FED. R. EVID. 604. 
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qualified experts, takes the special oath provided by Rule 604 (if they 
are in federal court) and provides (at least prima facie) authoritative 
evidence on the meaning of the spoken words.46  The use of official 
interpreters no doubt greatly reduces the danger of biased 
translation.  If the official certification program works as intended, it 
may also help guarantee competence. 
A different set of rules applies to an interpreter who translates 
words that were spoken or written at some earlier time, as 
memorialized in a document or an electronic recording.  In that 
situation, the translator is treated as an ordinary “language expert 
[under Rule 702] who [takes] the stand under oath, and subject[s] 
himself to cross-examination.  Rule 604 is inapplicable.”47  Since 
immediate, authoritative translation is not a functional necessity 
when the words are recorded, the usual rules for expert witnesses 
apply, and competing experts may offer different interpretations of 
statements in a foreign language.48  It is not clear to us how disputes 
over the accuracy of translations of live testimony are handled, except 
that the paucity of cases and commentary suggest that this is not a 
problem that is frequently litigated. 
The distinctive feature of the use of this type of expertise is the 
emphasis on clarity.  Because testimonial interpreters are imperative 
to the ongoing functioning of the system of oral testimony in the face 
of a language barrier, it is essential that they be comprehensible to 
the participants as they perform their function.  As a result, the Court 
Interpreters Act includes a specific provision for the replacement of 
an interpreter who does not “communicate effectively”49—a problem 
that in other expert contexts we let the adversaries sort out. 
Translation from less well-organized systems of specialized 
communication presents a different type of problem.  When the 
question is “What signs and words do drug dealers use to convey their 
meaning without being understood by outsiders?” it is much harder 
to find well-informed disinterested experts than when the question is 
“What does this German sentence mean in English?”  This can make 
it harder to find unbiased interpreters, and harder to check on the 
accuracy of a translation.  The classic troublesome case is the police 
 
 46 Court Interpreters Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1827(d)(1) (2003); United States v. Armijo, 
5 F.3d 1229, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v Taren-Palma, 997 F.2d 525, 531-
32 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 47 Taren-Palma, 977 F.2d. at 532. 
 48 See, e.g., United States v. Ben-Shimon, 249 F.3d 98, 101 (2d Cir. 2001) (“If the 
accuracy of the transcript is contested, competing transcripts may be submitted to 
the jury.”); United States v. Chalarca, 95 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 49 28 U.S.C. § 1827(e)(1). 
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officer who qualifies as an expert in some variety of underworld 
jargon.50  In that situation, the problem is frequently magnified by the 
fact that the officer-expert, who has an obvious interest in the 
outcome of the case, also testifies as a lay witness to critical acts by the 
criminal defendant or by others.  When that happens, the process of 
qualifying the officer as an expert—both the imprimatur given by the 
court and the character evidence on which it is based—may 
improperly bolster the officer’s lay testimony.51  And, of course, this 
takes place in the presentation of the prosecution’s case in a criminal 
trial, where our concern for accuracy ought to be at its highest. 
(c)  Calculation 
For this type of expertise, the question to the expert is some 
variant of “What does it add up to?”  Totaling up the grocery bill, 
even if you have to add sales tax, hardly requires an expert, but some 
tasks that involve nothing more than a complex set of arithmetic 
calculations (preparing a tax return) may benefit from an expert’s 
help.  If the job is big enough and complicated enough (calculating 
the indebtedness of a substantial company), or involves more 
sophisticated and difficult mathematical operations (calculating 
inferential statistics, or the force generated by a falling object) expert 
help is essential for most of us in any context, and always in court 
where the trier of fact is a lay jury or judge.  In that situation, an 
expert who testifies to calculations will usually also explain what this 
type of calculation means, a separate task that we discuss under the 
heading “instruction.” 
Calculation, like translation, is a task of making sense of 
information that is already available.  It can be done by any qualified 
expert once the data exist.  As with observation and translation, the 
central issue is the competence of the calculator—a question that 
 
 50 See United States v. Barnett, Nos. 02-4561, 02-4732, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 6953, 
at *3-5 (4th Cir. Apr. 11, 2003) (describing how a special agent was permitted to 
testify as an expert witness with regard to drug code); United States v. Ceballos, 302 
F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2002) (recounting that the government presented two agents 
as experts on drug code language who testified as to the content of several taped 
conversations played for the jury); United States v. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d 45, 53 (2nd 
Cir. 2001) (allowing an agent to serve as a dual witness testifying as a case agent and 
as an expert on drug code); United States v. Evans, 272 F.3d 1069, 1096 (8th Cir. 
2001) (upholding the admittance of a sergeant’s testimony regarding prostitution, 
including jargon); Bamberger, supra note 42. 
 51 See Dukagjini, 326 F.3d at 53-56; Bamberger, supra note 42, at 866-69 (discussing 
United States v. Young, 745 F.2d 733 (2d Cir. 1984)).  Though courts express concern 
about expert evidence bolstering the lay evidence, the inverse is also possible: if the 
factfinder believes the lay witness’s eyewitness account, she may be more inclined to 
trust her expert judgment as well. 
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usually can be routinely answered by reference to her training and 
experience.  In court, the qualifications of the expert are the only 
requirement for admissibility of this sort of expertise; mathematics 
itself is correctly considered to be universally reliable. 
Strictly speaking, calculation itself is absolutely predictable; 
mathematical operations leave no room for ambiguity.  Experts do 
disagree, however, on antecedent questions: what to count and how to 
do so.  As the assumptions that are built into the process become 
more complex and debatable, the task may slip from “calculation” to 
“assessment.”  As we have drawn the line in this Article, determining 
the indebtedness of a company is near the borderline.  We classify it, 
perhaps arbitrarily, as a “calculation,” although, as we all learned 
from the Enron and Arthur Andersen scandals, there are more ways 
than one to make the many underlying judgments on how to 
categorize various possible liabilities and assets.  On the other hand, 
we describe the task of estimating the present value of a person’s 
lifetime earnings if he had survived an accident as an “assessment.”  
The difference is not so much that this task is more complex or 
controversial than calculating indebtedness, but that it requires 
integrating information on, and making assumptions about, more 
disparate issues—productive life span, possible career paths, future 
employment trends and wage rates, productivity and inflation in the 
economy, and so forth.  As with observation, the location of the 
boundary line between the more descriptive task of “calculation” and 
the more analytic task of “assessment” is not crucial, as long as we 
realize that some calculations are based in part on controversial 
assumptions; that many assessments have calculations embedded in 
them; and that there are close cases that are hard to call. 
As calculation shades into assessment, questions of method and 
bias become increasingly salient.  The question may be not so much 
what the indebtedness of Enron adds up to, but what the expert 
means by “indebtedness.”  If both sides have access to competent 
experts, legal disputes that involve calculations are likely to focus on 
these choices and on the expert assessments on which they are based, 
or on the accuracy of the underlying data, rather than on the 
mathematical calculations themselves.  Since the results of the 
mathematical operations are determinate, there should be no more 
room to dispute the calculation that produces an estimate of the 
expected lifetime earning of a deceased plaintiff than to dispute the 
arithmetic (as opposed to the items) on a tab in a restaurant.  If there 
is a dispute, replication (in a restaurant or in court) is a perfect check 
on mathematical accuracy.  In theory, calculations and their 
underlying assumptions can always be teased apart, the assumptions 
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spelled out and separated from the calculations that follow.  In 
practice this may make the information too dense to absorb—we do 
not really want to know how and why our accountant calculated the 
tax as she did—and in any case it often is not done. 
2.  Instruction 
Experts, to state the obvious, educate—they provide lay people 
with useful information.  In court, the only function of an expert 
witness (or for that matter, any witness) is to educate, in this very 
general sense: to supply information that helps the trier of fact make 
decisions.52  We focus here on a particular kind of education—
“instruction”—by which we mean general information about some 
common issue or phenomenon (“Inadequate drainage can cause 
ground water to undermine a foundation”) rather than specific 
information about a particular problem or case (“The wall collapsed 
because of inadequate drainage at its base”).  Instruction answers 
such questions as “What do experts know about that topic?” and 
“How do things like that work?” 
Instruction provides background knowledge but not the case-
specific answers.53  An expert witness who gives purely instructional 
testimony in a trial can literally repeat the same performance in a 
different courtroom with a different cast of characters, in another 
case that raises a parallel issue with different specific facts.  
Instructional testimony may lead to an inference that suggests or even 
requires a specific decision in a given case, but it is not itself 
information about any particular case.  The statement “Bendectin is 
not a teratogen”—once controversial, now no longer so—is an 
example of instruction: it is a general empirical claim.  By contrast, 
the statement, “Ingestion of Bendectin by the plaintiff mother did 
not cause this limb defect in her offspring,” is no longer instruction.  
It follows logically from the general instructional statement, if true; 
but it also may be true even if that general statement is not.  In any 
case, the second assertion is a claim about the specific events involved 
 
 52 For a detailed analysis of experts as educators, see Ronald J. Allen & Joseph S. 
Miller, The Common Law Theory of Experts: Deference or Education, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 
1131 (1993). 
 53 Edward Imwinkelried has made a similar distinction between what he terms 
the expert’s major and minor premises: “The major premise is a principle, 
procedure, or explanatory theory derived by the inductive, scientific technique.  The 
[expert] applies that major premise to the facts of the case” and these specific facts 
are the witness’s minor premise.  Edward J. Imwinkelried, The “Bases” of Expert 
Testimony: The Syllogistic Structure of Scientific Testimony, 67 N.C.  L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1988); 
see also Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Educational Significance of the Syllogistic Structure of 
Expert Testimony, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 1148 (1993). 
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in the litigation—a type of statement that we classify and discuss as an 
assessment of causation. 
As usual, effort can make the boundaries fuzzy.  Consider, for 
example, the archetypal early twentieth-century hypothetical question 
in which the lawyer would ask an expert for his opinion about the 
cause of death of a “hypothetical person.”  In form, the lawyer would 
ask for an opinion on the cause of death of anybody in like 
circumstances, but the actual question (which sometimes went on for 
pages) would incorporate a whole series of particular facts that 
happened to be in evidence in the case at hand, and the expert 
would provide an opinion assuming these many ostensibly 
hypothetical facts to be true.54  Strictly speaking, the testimony is 
framed in general non-case-specific terms and, therefore, fits our 
definition of “instruction.”  But the effect, of course, if we look past 
the formal structure of the testimony to its substance, is an extremely 
fact-specific opinion that is best described as an “assessment.” 
Whatever the dividing line between instruction and assessment, 
most experts—and certainly most expert witnesses—go back and 
forth across it and provide both types of information.  This need not 
be the case.  Eyewitness identification experts, for example, if 
permitted at all, are typically allowed to provide instruction only.  
They may testify, for example, that in general cross-racial 
identification is more likely to be erroneous than intra-racial 
identifications, or that eyewitness confidence is not generally a good 
predictor of eyewitness accuracy.  But case-specific testimony 
evaluating the merits of a particular eyewitness’s identification, if 
offered, would typically be excluded as an invasion of the province of 
the jury.55  Most experts, however, do provide case-specific 
assessments, and usually incorporate instruction into that testimony, 
to make their conclusions both more comprehensible and more 
persuasive. 
In this Article we discuss two different kinds of instructional 
statements: claims about matters of fact in the physical world, and 
 
 54 The case of Treadwell v. Nickel, 228 P. 25 (Cal. 1924), describes an extreme 
example: an eighty-three page hypothetical question, followed by a fourteen page 
objection. 
 55 Some judges believe that even permitting expert testimony on the lack of 
relationship between confidence and accuracy invades the province of the jury.  In 
Garden v. State, 815 A.2d 327, 338 (Del. 2003), the trial court rejected the portion of 
the eyewitness identification expert’s testimony dealing with the 
confidence/accuracy relationship “because such opinion would amount to a 
comment on the veracity of the witnesses who testified and thus would invade the 
province of the jury.”  The Delaware Supreme Court found the exclusion to be error, 
albeit harmless.  Id. 
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statements about social norms—customs, common practices, ethical 
and professional standards, research methodologies.  In both 
contexts the expert gives her views on the state of the world—
instruction on norms, in this sense, is factual rather than normative—
but the purposes to which each kind of instruction are put in court 
are quite different.  Much (though by no means all) factual 
instruction is uncontested, and typically, even when controversial, it is 
not a central issue in a case but rather serves as the background for 
an assessment.  Occasionally, however, a disputed general factual 
proposition—in the classic case, “Bendectin is a human teratogen”—
is an essential element of a claim.  By contrast, in malpractice claims 
against professionals—lawyers, accountants, psychotherapists, and 
especially doctors—instructional opinions about norms—the 
professional standard of care for the conduct at issue—are often at 
the heart of the case.  As we shall see, these differences in nature and 
purpose have implications for the admissibility of these two types of 
instructional testimony. 
(a)  Facts 
If you want to know an esoteric fact, you ask an expert, or—
much the same thing—check a book or an article written by one.  
Most of the time we can rely on the information we get in this 
manner because the answer, although news to us, is well-known and 
uncontroversial among those who specialize in the area.  This can be 
true for information at any level of generality, from the universal 
(“the speed of light in vacuum is 299,792,458 meters per second”) to 
the highly particular (“73% of the respondents on this survey did not 
know the name of either of their United States senators”). 
In court, much expert information of this sort could be 
presented without testimony by any witness.  Frequently, the 
statements at issue—that human blood has a pH of 7.4, for example, 
or that every person (except an identical twin or a clone) has a 
unique DNA sequence—are suitable subjects for judicial notice 
because they are not open to reasonable dispute and are “capable of 
accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy 
cannot reasonably be questioned.” 56  In practice, such information is 
generally introduced in the course of expert testimony, in part 
because the statements accompany other information provided by 
the expert that could not properly be judicially noticed, and in part 
because a well-prepared expert witness is more likely than the judge 
to present the information in a manner that is helpful to the side that 
 
 56 FED R. EVID. 201. 
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called her. 
A layperson cannot know in advance which propositions are not 
in dispute in medicine or physics or genetics.  Out of court, we can 
guard against being misled (as usual) by asking more than one 
expert, or consulting more than one reference, or relying on a 
source—the United States Census Bureau, for example—whose 
authority we do not doubt.  In court, the adversarial process defines 
what is in dispute, and undeniable expert facts are likely to form part 
of the uncontested background for the assessments that are 
contested.  The parties may fight about whether a substance found in 
the defendant’s possession was cocaine, but they are not likely to 
fight about the chemical make-up of cocaine itself.  They might 
disagree about whether a DNA-typing test was done correctly in the 
particular case, or about how to interpret the evidentiary significance 
of finding the defendant’s DNA at the crime scene, but they are 
unlikely to do battle over the general premise that apart from 
identical twins, a person’s DNA genome is unique.  On background 
issues of that sort, there is no debate about factual accuracy, and 
hence no question of reliability or admissibility.  There is still room 
for bias, of course, in the selection and organization of the material.  
A testifying expert (like any teacher) chooses what to present from a 
large array of possible pieces of information; she may select the 
background facts most useful to her party’s case and omit other 
information that is less helpful to her client.  This form of bias is 
almost invariably addressed by cross-examination and rebuttal 
testimony rather than exclusion.  Assuming the opposing party is 
motivated and prepared, these may well be adequate mechanisms for 
checking partisan impulses to provide partial information. 
As we move away from well known facts about which there is 
little or no disagreement, matters become more complicated.  In 
theory, this is a problem that can be addressed: after more tests, more 
study, and more examination, we might someday reach answers that, 
if not wholly conclusive, may at least achieve widespread consensus.  
For a straightforward issue—the population of Detroit in 2000—a 
single, well-executed study (the decennial census), despite its 
imperfections, may provide as good an answer as we will ever have.  
But for difficult and complex questions (the origin of HIV; the 
structure of quarks) the process is likely to be complicated and 
uncertain, and even many comparatively easy issues are never 
addressed, or the studies are not complete when we need them.  
Whether because of the complexity of the issue or the paucity of the 
data (or both), at any point in time, a general factual question may 
have no clear answer.  Knowledgeable people may disagree on what 
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the answer is, or whether it is known, or even whether the question is 
answerable.  And even if there is a reasonably clear answer out there 
somewhere, it may be no mean feat to find it.  None of us can absorb 
even a tiny fraction of the general knowledge that exists in our 
extremely complex culture.  We have no choice but to rely on 
experts, those who know the issue best—which merely pushes the 
problem back a step, to the identification of the most knowledgeable 
experts to rely on. 
How do we determine matters of instructional fact outside of the 
courtroom?  On routine issues, even debatable ones—and often on 
big ones as well—we do not invest a lot of energy in screening expert 
instruction.  We look in well-known sources or ones we are familiar 
with (the Internet, the New York Times), we ask experts we have used 
before who are referred to us by friends and acquaintances, or we see 
what highly-credentialed experts have to say.  If it really matters, 
however—if a lot of money, or the future of an institution, or 
someone’s life or health is at stake—we increase our search costs.  We 
spend time and energy to identify leading experts and to learn what 
they think about the matter. 
What exactly are we searching for?  Since we cannot identify 
accurate expert instruction directly, we look for the best available 
proxy: the consensus of well-informed experts in the field.  Of course 
there may not be a consensus, and if there is, it may be out-of-date or 
just plain wrong.  But figuring out the consensus viewpoint, if there is 
one, is the starting point of any well-conducted inquiry into general 
facts outside of litigation; more often than not, it is the ending point 
as well. 
In the context of litigation, identifying a consensus among 
experts in court can be very hard.  The expert’s credentials are not 
much help.  An imperfect proxy for knowledge in the best of 
circumstances, credentials lose nearly all of whatever value they may 
have when expert witnesses are chosen by the parties, from among 
those who will say what the parties want to hear, in part precisely 
because of their seemingly impressive credentials.57  Worse, the 
 
 57 See Gross, supra note 25, at 1134.  With most witnesses, parties are constrained 
by circumstances: they have no choice but to use those who, because of their physical 
relationship to the facts, have uniquely valuable information.  (The personal 
knowledge rule operates as a proxy for information quality, supplemented by 
extensive (though not necessarily effective) mechanisms for testing witness credibility 
to weed out percipient but unreliable observers.)  In the context of factual 
instruction, where the issues are ones of general knowledge, parties are not limited 
by the happenstance of percipient witnesses.  Since they can call any qualified expert 
who is willing to cooperate, they can, in principle, get the best available evidence in 
every case.  In practice, their dominant incentive is to get the most useful expert 
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parties who call expert witnesses have no common interest in 
identifying a consensus among experts.  On the contrary, if there is 
any room at all for a dispute among experts, one side or both may 
have an interest in obscuring the extent of general agreement within 
the field and creating the appearance of an active dispute when there 
is none.  The experts the parties call may take positions that are at 
best outliers within their own specialties but sound perfectly plausible 
to outsiders.  If the factfinder is a jury, it may not even have the power 
to put questions to the party experts, much less seek another opinion 
or investigate another source.58  If the plaintiff calls an expert who 
testifies that silicone gel breast implants are known to cause auto-
immune diseases, and the defendant calls an expert who testifies that 
there is no evidence that these devices produce that effect, the 
factfinder is in no position to judge which statement reflects a 
consensus in the field, if one exists, and which statement is 
considered unlikely or simply false.  In any other contexts, the answer 
would be to check with experts who are not chosen by and identified 
with those parties whose interests are directly at stake—a panel 
assembled by the NIH rather than researchers hired by the 
pharmaceutical company whose product is being studied.  That 
procedure is available in court under Federal Rule of Evidence 706, 
but, as we have mentioned, it is rarely used, and almost never in 
routine cases. 
If credentials do not help much, and unbiased expertise is not 
sought, what legal tools are left to address conflicting expert claims 
about general factual propositions?  We can exclude the evidence, or 
we can do our best to make use of what we get.  In practice, we rely 
on the second sort of remedy more often than the first. 
Daubert and its progeny—including the post-Daubert version of 
Rule 702—require courts to assess the validity of this sort of expert 
evidence.  But how?  By what standard?  If we are not concerned 
about the validity of the field (if we are dealing with medicine, for 
example, and not astrology), a consensus of informed experts about 
the matter of general fact should certainly be sufficient to justify 
admission, but is probably too much to require.  On one hand, if the 
cause of a phenomenon is unknown—and generally agreed to be 
unknown—this requirement would prevent the jury from getting any 
meaningful expert assistance on causation, since the only thing an 
expert witness could testify to is the consensus that experts do not 
 
testimony to support their position, not the most accurate. 
 58 Some courts permit jurors to ask questions of witnesses through the judge, but 
this varies by jurisdiction and the temperament of the judge.  Judges can, of course, 
question witnesses. 
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know.  On the other hand, for the large array of issues on which 
experts disagree on whether there is a consensus, or on what the 
consensus is, this rule would be impossible to administer.  Could 
judges possibly determine the existence of an expert consensus, item 
for item, as a precondition to permitting any expert witness to make 
general factual claims?  The difficulties of applying Frye pale by 
comparison. 
A judge could demand a lesser degree of agreement as 
condition for expert instruction.  A mild version of this inquiry into 
the consensus of the field seems to us to be a reasonable requirement 
for expert instruction.  Because the judge’s role is merely to decide 
whether the information may be considered at all, the test should be 
whether other experts in the field generally agree that the factual 
claim is plausible.  This is a different kind of agreement than that 
demanded by Frye (“general acceptance” of the method or 
technique), and it does not require any level of agreement on the 
ultimate truth of any asserted fact.  The focus, rather, is on the 
legitimacy of the factual claim: is it (at a minimum) considered a 
debatable point among those who know best? 
Rule 702 speaks to the issue of instructional testimony only 
obliquely.59  This category of testimony does not fit neatly into the 
Rule’s structure, which assumes that expert testimony will apply “to 
the facts of the case.”60  Nonetheless, Rule 702 can be interpreted to 
impose a reliability requirement on general factual instruction, as for 
all expert testimony.  To the extent that courts do scrutinize scientific 
testimony about general facts, we suspect that their inquiry focuses on 
the kind of consensus we have described: the degree of plausibility of 
the factual proposition within the witness’s field.  In general, 
however, the courts make no such inquiry.  They simply require that 
an expert be “qualified,” and then—except in a small group of 
unusual but important cases—allow them to make a wide range of 
general factual claims within their fields of expertise.  Once a witness 
has been permitted to testify as an expert under Rule 702, judges 
usually leave the task of correcting and explaining their instructional 
statements to the opposing parties and the expert witnesses they call. 
Occasionally, a party may call an expert witness who says things 
that are simply bizarre.  This seems to happen most often in criminal 
cases, where resources and standards of practice—especially on the 
defense side—are sometimes abysmally low.  In the 1980s, for 
 
 59 FED. R. EVID. 702.  Rule 702 was revised in 2000 in the wake of Daubert and 
Kumho Tire to emphasize the reliability requirement for expert testimony. 
 60 Id. 
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example, an anthropologist named Louise Robbins was allowed to 
testify for the prosecution in several cases that it is possible to identify 
a person from nothing more than a shoe print—the wearer, not the 
shoe.61  The only explanation is incompetence by the judges, the 
defense attorneys, or both.  (Her testimony was also excluded several 
times.  Even so, the fact that she did testify repeatedly—indeed, that 
prosecutors even considered using her—is some measure of what’s 
not considered a problem.)  Usually, however, it is not the statement 
itself that is implausible but the confidence with which it is uttered.  
The problem is not the assertion that exposure to asbestos might 
cause colon cancer, but the claim that it does. 
On reflection, it appears that the level of certainty that a witness 
attaches to a statement is likely to be the dominant problem for this 
type of expert testimony.  If an expert testifies, for example, that a 
scientific study published in a peer-reviewed journal found that 
ephedra had a teratogenic effect on mice when ingested at a certain 
dose, this is as unproblematic as instructional testimony can be; the 
expert is reporting a fact that can easily be checked.  The expert 
might then go on to testify, however, on the basis of that study 
(perhaps in conjunction with other information, perhaps not), that 
in her opinion ephedra is a human teratogen.  Although phrased as 
an “opinion” this second claim is still “instruction” rather than 
“assessment,” since the conclusion remains general rather than case-
specific.  But there is much more reason to be concerned about 
reliability at this higher level of generality.  The study might be biased 
or poorly-conceived, and even if it is flawless, it might not be a 
sufficient basis for the expert’s general conclusion.  Even so, the issue 
is not so much the possible causal link the expert draws between 
ephedra and birth defects, but her confidence in the existence of 
that link.  Few would quarrel with the witness if she had said that 
ephedra “might” be a human teratogen, or even perhaps that “there 
is a substantial risk” that it causes birth defects.  The problem 
emerges as she moves up the ladder from possible to probable, to very 
likely, to is. 
In the usual case, however, testimony is not excluded because a 
witness is too certain or too uncertain.  Normally, a witness’s level of 
confidence is grist for the adversarial mill: the jury considers it in 
evaluating the witness’s credibility, taking into account any in-roads 
made in cross-examination, inconsistent evidence on rebuttal, and 
arguments by counsel.  Lots of witnesses are excessively self-assured; 
 
 61 See Paul C. Giannelli, The Abuse of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: The Need 
for Independent Crime Laboratories, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 439, 457-62 (1997) 
(discussing Louise Robbins’s so-called expertise). 
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many are simply wrong.  We do not exclude an eyewitness who says 
she is 100% certain that she can identify the defendant as the man 
she saw from fifty feet, across a dark parking lot, for five seconds; we 
impeach her.  By the same token, we do not generally exclude 
testimony from a doctor who says that he knows that regular exercise 
decreases the risk of coronary heart disease.  Like the eyewitness, 
even if this expert is correct on the ultimate issue, she may not be 
entitled to speak with the level of confidence that she expresses; like 
the eyewitness, the jury will usually be allowed to hear her testimony, 
and the opposing party will have a chance to try to get her to weaken 
or qualify it, or to make it seem unreasonable. 
There are, however, several important differences between the 
lay eyewitness and the expert providing fact instruction.  The 
structural incentives for the expert to distort and overstate are 
significantly greater.  The pressure of litigation, the partisan 
identification an expert may develop over time, and the fact that the 
expert receives payment may spur even a well-intentioned expert to 
make instructional inferences in a stronger form than a fair-minded 
reading of the evidence supports.  Moreover, it may be precisely the 
degree of overstatement that makes otherwise plausible testimony 
unreliable. 
When does a general factual proposition become so 
unreasonable that it may be excluded entirely from evidence?  In 
some tort cases a general factual proposition is a necessary step to 
establish causation, and substantive tort law requires expert testimony 
on causation that is phrased in terms of a specified level of 
confidence.  In that situation the admissibility of expert instructional 
testimony on a question of general fact is outcome determinative, 
and detailed attention by the parties and the court is worth the 
candle.  For example, in Joiner,62 the plaintiff claimed that he was 
exposed to PCBs by the defendant, and that the exposure caused the 
small cell lung cancer from which he suffered.  The district court 
excluded the plaintiff’s proffered expert testimony on causation 
because “the court is not persuaded by a preponderance of proof that 
the studies support the ‘knowledge’ the experts purport to have (i.e., 
that PCBs, ‘to a ‘reasonable degree of medical certainty,’’ promote 
small cell lung cancer in humans).”63  And, since the plaintiff was now 
without this necessary testimony—“to a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty”—the court granted the defendant’s motion for summary 
 
 62 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
 63 Joiner v. Gen. Elec. Co., 864 F. Supp. 1310, 1326 (N.D. Ga. 1994) (internal 
citation omitted). 
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judgment and dismissed the claim. 
In Joiner, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s 
ruling.64  The main issue in Joiner was the standard of review on 
appeal of a ruling excluding evidence under Rule 702.  The Supreme 
Court concluded that “abuse of discretion is the proper standard by 
which to review a district court’s decision to admit or exclude 
scientific evidence,” and that “the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in excluding . . . [the plaintiff’s expert] testimony.”65 
Under Joiner, other district courts could reach the opposite 
conclusion and admit identical expert testimony on the identical 
issue of general causation.  This is a disturbing rule.  The trial court’s 
conclusion in Joiner that “there is simply too great an analytical gap 
between the data and the opinion” is really a substantive judgment 
that the plaintiff’s evidence is insufficient masquerading as a 
procedural judgment that it is inadmissible.  It may make perfect 
sense to give trial courts the authority to decide this issue—but why 
call it an evidentiary ruling, all but eliminate appellate oversight, and 
create a situation in which the very evidence that is legally sufficient 
to prove a fact before Judge Monday is excluded entirely by Judge 
Friday? 
There are bounds on the discretion conferred by Joiner.  Courts 
do not like to look (or to be) foolish.  If a general proposition 
becomes widely accepted in a respected community of experts, courts 
usually fall in line, if sometimes after an uncomfortable gap.  In the 
first part of the twentieth century, most physicians believed that a 
single traumatic blow could cause a malignant tumor, but by 1940 
there was a medical consensus rejecting this theory.  It had an 
afterlife of sorts, however, in court: it was presented with approval in 
at least a few cases for another fifteen or twenty years66—but 
apparently not beyond the early 1960s.  Today, it would be rejected 
out of hand. 
We have seen this process repeatedly in the past several decades 
in mass toxic tort litigation.  In a typical mass tort situation, many 
separate plaintiffs make the identical argument on general causation, 
the issue is subject to systematic study and replication, and vast 
amounts of money are at stake.  Given these circumstances, the 
general causal relationship between the substance and the pathology 
at issue is studied repeatedly, and eventually everybody (or almost 
 
 64 Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (affirming the district court’s exclusion and reversing a 
decision by the Eleventh Circuit). 
 65 522 U.S. at 146-47. 
 66 Gross, supra note 25, at 1184 n.217. 
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everybody) agrees that there is or is not a causal connection.  In 
Daubert, for example, the plaintiff’s experts were prepared to testify in 
1989 “that to within a reasonable degree of certainty Bendectin is a 
teratogen,”67—testimony that in form is very similar to that offered in 
Joiner.  But the context was different.  By 1989, thirty separate 
epidemiological studies had failed to find a significant relationship 
between Bendectin and birth defects.68  Given that body of 
knowledge, the proposition that Bendectin does not cause birth 
defects—like the claims that asbestosis causes lung cancer69 and that 
silicone-gel breast implants do not cause systemic disease70—was no 
longer open to debate.  One way or another, courts now treat these 
factual statements as rules of law. 
Courts do not generally have problems with the expert 
instruction that sticks close to observable facts.  They will not hesitate 
to admit testimony from a harbor pilot who testifies that he has seen 
several twelve-meter yachts pass under a particular bridge at high 
tide, or from a doctor who testifies that he has seen several patients 
with this sort of injury relearn to walk.  Whether we trust doctors 
more than pilots (or less), the structure of the testimony is the same: 
“I’ve seen it happen; draw your own conclusions.”  For factual 
generalizations, however, courts are likely to discriminate between 
fields in a manner that reflects their assessment of the strength of the 
scientific basis for the discipline.  The harbor pilot will be allowed to 
testify about the height of tides in the harbor he works in, but not 
about the causes of unusual tidal patterns.  Epidemiological evidence 
that asbestos causes lung cancer is viewed as conclusive, but testimony 
from a questioned document examiner that forgeries can always be 
detected will meet with skepticism, and testimony from an astrologer 
that Virgos have controlling personalities would be excluded if it 
 
 67 Daubert, 727 F. Supp. at 574 (emphasis added). 
 68 Daubert, 951 F.2d at 1129. 
 69 See, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Ayers, ___U.S. ___, 123 S. Ct. 1210, 1222 (2003) 
(“[T]here is an undisputed relationship between exposure to asbestos sufficient to 
cause asbestosis, and asbestos-related cancer.”). 
 70 See, e.g., Meister v. Med. Eng’g Corp., 267 F.3d 1123, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(“[T]he defendants introduced expert testimony that was supported by a uniform 
body of evidence including epidemiological studies failing to establish a causal link 
between silicone breast implants and connective tissue disease . . . .  Hence, the 
district court could reasonably conclude that reasonable people could not differ as to 
the import of the epidemiological evidence.”); Pozefsky v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 
92-CV-0314 (LEK)(RWS), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11813, at *20 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 
2001) (“Because Plaintiff has failed to establish the scientific reliability of his theories 
on causation and the overwhelming weight of scientific authority to the contrary, the 
Court will join these courts and exclude the testimony of [Plaintiff’s expert] as to the 
causation of Plaintiff’s alleged [systemic] condition by her silicone breast implants.”). 
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were ever offered. 
These sorts of distinctions, of course, are exactly what Rule 702 
requires: courts must determine whether expert instruction “is the 
product of reliable principles and methods.”71  For factual 
generalizations about the nature of the world, our touchstone is the 
scientific method of observation, experimentation, and replication.  
How proficient courts are at applying these principles is another 
question.  Occasionally, they exclude plausible but unproven 
generalizations (for example, that exposure to PCBs promotes small 
cell lung cancer).  More often, courts admit unreliable 
generalizations because they are accustomed to evidence of that 
sort—handwriting expertise, for example72—or because the witness 
has impressive professional credentials—a Ph.D. (like Louise 
Robbins73) or an M.D. 
(b)  Norms 
A different kind of instructional information concerns the 
norms of a field—typically, customs and standards of care.  In a 
malpractice suit, for example, a witness may testify about the 
appropriate standard of care for treatment of asthma in infants, 
offering instructional expertise.  These claims are also empirical—the 
witness is describing the custom of the field, her opinion about what 
is done in ordinary practice—but the empirical facts they concern are 
socially created.  The expert’s task is not to describe the best 
treatment for a condition, but rather the standard treatment.  Ideally, 
the latter will conform to the former, but not immediately, not 
always, and not everywhere. 
Outside of litigation, this category of expert information is 
comparatively unimportant, except to the extent that it is used in less 
formal attempts to assign responsibility or blame.  In torts cases 
involving professionals, however—doctors, lawyers, accountants, 
psychotherapists—these instructional opinions are often the heart of 
the case, the key testimony on the key legal question.  Because the 
content of professional norms is central to malpractice litigation, 
factual information about these norms is essential.  Because this 
information concerns social norms rather than natural facts, it is 
treated differently from other types of expert instruction. 
The only essential requirement for an expert on the norms of a 
community is, obviously, familiarity with that community and its 
 
 71 FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 72 On the history of handwriting identification, see Mnookin, supra note 12. 
 73 Giannelli, supra note 61. 
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behavior.  This prerequisite mirrors the knowledge that is required of 
a  translator, except that in this context, the expert must be familiar 
with the customs and practices of the culture (or subculture) rather 
than its language.  Accordingly, in court, the only requirement for an 
expert witness who testifies about professional norms is that she 
qualify as an expert in that profession.  Any competent 
endocrinologist can offer opinions about the ordinary and acceptable 
practice of endocrinologists, and any experienced criminal defense 
attorney can talk about the norms of her profession. 
Note that the ultimate question in cases involving standards of 
care or custom is Frye-like: What is the generally accepted practice of a 
given community?  Here however, the “general acceptability” of a 
practice is a question for the trier of fact, not a foundational 
requirement for admissibility.  Since the content of the norm is the 
question for the jury—and perhaps also because the issue is so 
thoroughly one of social norms—we are willing to admit even 
idiosyncratic opinions about community norms, so long as these 
idiosyncratic opinions come from bona fide members of the relevant 
community.  The key for determining admissibility is the speaker, 
rather than the substance of what is spoken; we evaluate 
qualifications, rather than the validity of the content of the testimony. 
There are, of course, subsidiary issues.  How close must the fit be 
between qualifications and the question at issue?  Should a non-
specialist physician be able to testify about the custom of a particular 
medical specialty?  Should a family practitioner be allowed to testify 
about the standard of care in a case involving high-risk obstetrics?  
Should a properly trained physician who no longer sees patients be 
allowed to testify about treatment norms?  Courts have generally 
treated these issues as going to weight rather than admissibility, but at 
some point, a mismatch between the expert’s experience and the 
norms about which she is testifying may become so glaring that 
exclusion is appropriate. 
As always, bias is an important issue for instructional expert 
testimony about standards and customs.  Two kinds of bias are of 
particular concern.  First, there is partisanship—the bias of the 
professional expert who may be all too willing, consciously or 
unconsciously, to tailor her testimony to suit her client’s needs.  
Second, there may be a problem of professional solidarity—a 
tendency to avoid criticism of colleagues.  Even if they have no 
personal relationship, one physician may be reluctant to testify 
against another, either out of a sense of professional camaraderie, or 
because the witness recognizes that the mistake the defendant made 
was one that the witness could well have made herself.  In addition, 
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there is the general problem of hindsight bias: it may be too easy 
after the event to criticize actions that were in fact reasonable in light 
of what was known at the time.  All of these issues of bias typically are 
understood to affect the weight of the evidence but not its 
admissibility. 
Daubert and its progeny have had little effect on this kind of 
instructional testimony.  While physicians’ evidence about causation 
in toxic torts cases has been curtailed in the last decade,74 physicians’ 
testimony about standards of care remains substantially unchanged.  
This lack of substantive scrutiny seems largely appropriate since there 
is no external standard by which to evaluate evidence on the norms 
and practices of a social group.  For the same reason, however, courts 
should scrutinize the fit between the speaker’s experience and the 
community about which she speaks.  Of course, requiring too close a 
fit may heighten the danger of bias.  If only Charlottesville 
cardiovascular surgeons can testify about the proper standard of care 
for a triple-bypass operation in Charlottesville, we might be 
concerned that the only qualified witnesses would be biased in favor 
of the defendant because of local professional and community ties; a 
concern for fit should not be used as an argument for resurrecting 
the locality rule in medical malpractice cases.  On the other hand, it 
seems reasonable to require that the witness practice cardiovascular 
surgery somewhere.  So long as professional communities are defined 
on a national basis, it ought to be possible to require a close fit for an 
expert who testifies on professional norms without unduly limiting 
the pool of potential witnesses. 
3.  Assessment 
When we hire an expert, an architect, or a surgeon, we usually 
want them to do things for us.  One of the most important things we 
may want them to do is make decisions—where to build, whether to 
operate—or at least to make specific recommendations.  Other than 
doing the tasks themselves, that is the central function of experts: to 
provide specific, concrete advice on what course of action to take.  
Their most conspicuous function in court is much the same, but in a 
context in which that sort of advice is otherwise prohibited. 
Perhaps the most basic distinction in American trials is between 
the job of the witness and that of the trier of fact.  These are the only 
two absolutely essential speaking roles in court.  The parties typically 
only speak as witnesses, and we can and often do conduct trials 
 
 74 On the transformation of standards for proving causation, see Finley, supra 
note 16, and Sanders & Machal-Fulks, supra note 16. 
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entirely without lawyers.  But there can be no trial without someone 
to provide evidence and someone to judge it.  At ancient common 
law, these functions might merge: jurors were sometimes selected 
because they knew the circumstances of the case.  We now require 
strict separation.  Jurors and judges evaluate evidence, but do not 
produce it.  They may only consider information about the case that 
they hear from witnesses in court; they may not be witnesses 
themselves;75 and if they know too much about the facts from extra-
record sources, they may not be allowed to serve at all.  On the other 
side, witnesses are supposed to present information, not evaluate it.  
They are limited by the personal knowledge76 and lay opinion77 rules 
to testimony about matters they perceived (“I saw two men cross the 
street”), and to low level descriptive inferences based directly on their 
own perceptions (“The older-looking man was speaking very 
quickly”). 
Except for experts.  Expert witnesses are not subject to the 
personal knowledge rule or the lay opinion rule.  They are allowed to 
make wide-ranging evaluations based on many types of evidence, first- 
and second-hand, admissible and inadmissible; they may express 
opinions on the precise factual issues the judge or jury must decide; 
they may evaluate the entire body of evidence before the court and 
tell the trier of fact what decision to reach.  These case-specific 
evaluations, applying background knowledge and expert skill to the 
facts at hand, are what we call “assessments.”  In many cases expert 
assessments take the form of judgments that can be adopted directly 
by the trier of fact: “The accident was caused by faulty wiring in the 
fuselage,” or “the defendant is the biological father of the minor 
child.”  For some claims, expert assessments are required as elements 
of proof. 
Because of their power and importance, expert assessments have 
received a great deal of attention.  They are the visible high-end of 
expert evidence.  For just that reason, we devote relatively little space 
to them.  Our main agenda is to explore types of expert evidence that 
have received insufficient attention, and this one does not qualify.  
Quite the opposite: We could not begin to do justice to the range of 
assessments that are offered by expert witnesses, or to the vast 
literature discussing them.  Instead, we will offer a set of observations 
that connect expert assessments to the other types of expert 
evidence—observation and instruction—that we have already 
 
 75 See FED. R. EVID. 605 (prohibiting judges from testifying as witnesses); FED. R. 
EVID. 606 (prohibiting jurors from testifying as witnesses). 
 76 FED. R. EVID. 602. 
 77 FED. R. EVID. 701. 
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discussed.  Indeed, we have already discussed expert assessments 
themselves, to some extent, to point out the distinctions between 
assessment and observation or instruction, and the overlaps between 
them. 
We use a medical malpractice case, Zuchowicz v. United States,78 to 
illustrate a common and important type of expert assessment and to 
raise two issues that we will talk about briefly: (1) the relationship 
between assessments and other types of expert evidence, and (2) the 
treatment of expert assessments that are not based on “science.”  
While our discussion focuses primarily on assessments of causation, 
much of the analysis is applicable to the other kinds of assessment in 
our taxonomy as well. 
(a)  Assessments and other types of expert evidence 
The plaintiff in Zuchowicz developed the rare disease Primary 
Pulmonary Hypertension (PPH) shortly after a naval pharmacy 
instructed her to take over twice the maximum daily dose of the drug 
Danocrine.79  The United States as defendant conceded that its 
doctors and/or pharmacists had been negligent, and that the 
plaintiff died from this disease.  The only triable issues were 
causation—did the overdose of Danocrine cause Mrs. Zuchowicz’s 
PPH?—and damages.  The district court, sitting without a jury, 
granted judgment to the plaintiff, and the Second Circuit affirmed.80 
Most of the factual discussion in the Second Circuit opinion is 
based on expert evidence, although the court does not always seem to 
be aware of this.  We are told that starting in late February 1989, 
Mrs. Zuchowicz took the 1600 milligrams of Danocrine each day 
for the next month.  Thereafter, from March 24 until May 30, she 
took 800 milligrams per day.  While taking Danocrine she 
experienced abnormal weight gain, bloating, edema, hot flashes, 
night sweats, a racing heart, chest pains, dizziness, headaches, 
acne, and fatigue.81 
The symptoms discussed in this section could have been described by 
lay observers.  Undoubtedly, most of the information (hot flashes, 
night sweats, headaches, dizziness, etc.) originally came from 
statements by the deceased plaintiff herself.  In practice, however, it is 
likely that all of these symptoms were described in court by experts, 
the testifying physicians, and mostly on the basis of reports from 
 
 78 140 F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 79 Id. at 383. 
 80 Zuchowicz v. United States, 870 F. Supp. 15 (D. Conn. 1994), aff’d, 140 F.3d 
381 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 81 Zuchowicz, 140 F.3d at 384. 
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other physicians or nurses.  Certainly few patients would describe a 
symptom they experience as “edema.”  We are then told that: 
In October 1989, [Mrs. Zuchowicz] was diagnosed with primary 
pulmonary hypertension (“PPH”), a rare and fatal disease in 
which increased pressure in an individual’s pulmonary artery 
causes severe strain on the right side of the heart.  At the time she 
was diagnosed with the disease, the median life expectancy for 
PPH sufferers was 2.5 years.  Treatments included calcium 
channel blockers and heart and lung transplantation.82 
Most of this section is expert instruction: the nature of PPH, the 
fact that it is rare, a patient’s life expectancy after diagnosis, and 
standard treatments.  The initial statement, however, is an expert 
assessment: that the plaintiff was diagnosed as suffering from PPH.  In 
the context of this case, it is not controversial, but it is an expert 
assessment of her condition all the same.  Inevitably, it will have been 
based in part on expert observations—blood pressure measurements, 
perhaps other tests—by the testifying witnesses or (more likely) by 
other experts, that may or may not have been described in court. 
The opinion next proceeds to a detailed discussion of the PPH: 
Pulmonary hypertension is categorized as “primary” when it 
occurs in the absence of other heart or lung diseases.  
“Secondary” pulmonary hypertension is diagnosed when the 
hypertension results from another heart or lung disease, such as 
emphysema or blood clots.  PPH is very rare.  A National Institute 
of Health registry recorded only 197 cases of PPH from the 
mid-1980s until 1992.  It occurs predominantly in young women.  
Exogenous agents known to be capable of causing PPH include 
birth control pills, some appetite suppressants, chemotherapy 
drugs, rapeseed oil, and L-Tryptophan. 
According to the district court’s findings of fact, the disease 
involves the interplay of the inner layers of the pulmonary blood 
vessels known as the endothelium and the vascular smooth 
muscle.  The endothelium releases substances called vasodilators 
and vasoconstrictors, which dilate and constrict the blood 
vessels.83 
The court goes on to present the current theory of the cause of 
PPH: “If too many vasoconstrictors are released, the blood vessels 
 
 82 Id. (citation omitted). 
 83 Id. at 384-85 (internal citations omitted).  In the context of this case, the 
instructional testimony about the causal relation between PPH and other drugs was 
uncontroverted, part of the generally accepted background information about the 
condition.  If one of these other causal relations were at issue in the case, what was 
taken as true in Zuchowicz might instead have been challenged as insufficiently 
established. 
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contract, the endothelial cells die, and the vascular smooth muscle 
cells proliferate.  These actions create increased pulmonary vascular 
resistance.”84  All of this, of course, is based on expert instruction, 
which continued in the court’s discussion of the drug at issue, 
Danocrine: 
According to the testimony of plaintiff’s expert Dr. W. Paul 
D’Mowski, who personally performed much of the initial research 
on the drug, Danocrine is safe and effective when administered 
properly.  Based on studies by Dr. D’Mowski and others, 
Danocrine was approved by the Food and Drug Administration 
(“FDA”) for use in dosages not to exceed 800 mg/day.  Mrs. 
Zuchowicz was accidentally given a prescription instructing her to 
take twice this amount—1600 mg/day.  According to Dr. 
D’Mowski no formal studies of the effects of Danocrine at such 
high doses have been performed, and very, very few women have 
received doses this high in any setting.85 
This too is expert instruction, and like everything above it, 
uncontroversial, at least in this case.  With all that now on the table, 
the dispute is narrowed to the two last points the plaintiff must prove: 
“(a) that defendant’s act in giving Mrs. Zuchowicz Danocrine was the 
source of her illness and death, and (b) that it was not just the 
Danocrine, but its negligent overdose that led to Mrs. Zuchowicz’s 
demise.”86 
After the discussions of PPH and Danocrine, the opinion turns 
to a new section entitled “The Expert Testimony” and describes in 
detail the testimony of two expert witnesses for the plaintiff, a 
professor of medicine and a professor of pharmacology.87  The 
heading is telling, and misleading.  Most of the opinion up to this 
point is based on expert testimony; one of the experts (Dr. 
D’Mowski) is even named.  What distinguishes the issues discussed 
under the heading “The Expert Testimony” from those discussed 
above it is that they are in dispute; they define the question the court 
must answer: did the plaintiff adequately prove causation?  This is a 
difficult, perhaps unanswerable question; it is the focus of the case.  
But the context of the question is at least equally important; the 
issues have been narrowed to that one question, and the court has 
learnt a great deal about what is generally known (or believed) about 
Danocrine and PPH.  All of this is the product of expert testimony. 
And what was included in the evidence labeled “Expert 
 
 84 Id. at 385. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at 389. 
 87 Zuchowicz, 140 F.3d at 385. 
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Testimony”?  Two critical items: 
Dr. Matthay testified that he was confident to a reasonable 
medical certainty that the Danocrine caused Mrs. Zuchowicz’s 
PPH.  When pressed, he added that he believed the overdose of 
Danocrine to have been responsible for the disease.88 
. . . . 
Dr. Tackett testified that, to a reasonable degree of scientific 
certainty, he believed that the overdose of Danocrine, more likely 
than not, caused PPH in the plaintiff . . . .89 
The court then proceeds to describe the mechanisms by which, 
according to Dr. Tackett, Danocrine probably caused the plaintiff’s 
illness and death. 
These are expert assessments of the most ambitious sort.  Drs. 
Matthay and Tackett each testified, in effect, “If I were judge, I’d find 
for the plaintiff on the issue of causation.”  Like any other layperson 
who consults an expert, the trial judge was free to disregard this 
advice.  In fact—although it is not relevant to the Second Circuit 
opinion—the defendant almost certainly presented other experts 
who said the opposite.90  A plaintiff, however, is required to present 
expert evidence of this sort to meet her burden of proof in a medical 
malpractice case,91 and if it is accepted by the trier of fact, she wins.  
In this case, as always, the expert assessments were built on a 
foundation of expert description and instruction.  Much of that was 
uncontroversial: Mrs. Zuchowicz’s medical history, the nature of PPH, 
etc.  But each of the doctors also relied, implicitly if not explicitly, on 
two general factual claims that were controversial: that Danocrine can 
cause PPH, and that an overdose of Danocrine increases the chances 
of developing PPH.92  Those propositions were as necessary a step in 
their reasoning as the parallel claim in Daubert that Bendectin can 
cause birth defects.  To the extent that they were discussed explicitly, 
that too was expert instruction: testimony designed to persuade the 
trier of fact on an issue of general application. 
 
 88 Id. (emphasis in original). 
 89 Id. at 386. 
 90 The trial court’s opinion mentioned one of the defendant’s experts in passing, 
noting that this expert acknowledged one of the plaintiff’s experts to be an expert in 
pulmonary hypertension.  Zuchowicz, 870 F. Supp. at 18. 
 91 See Aspiazu v. Orgera, 535 A.2d 338, 342 (Conn. 1987); Shelnitz v. Greenberg, 
509 A.2d 1023, 1027 (Conn. 1986).  Aspiazu was cited in Zuchowicz by the Second 
Circuit, 140 F.3d at 389, and by the trial court, 870 F. Supp. at 16. 
 92 If the plaintiff would have been equally likely to get PPH if she had received 
the proper dose, then the pharmacy’s negligence would not have been the cause of 
her illness. 
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(b)  Nonscientific assessments 
In Daubert, the Court noted that while Rule 702 applies to all 
expert testimony, “[o]ur discussion is limited to the scientific context 
because that is the nature of the expertise offered here.”93  That left 
open the question of whether Daubert applies to nonscientific 
expertise.  In Kumho Tire, the Court said Yes: “We conclude that 
Daubert’s general holding—setting forth the trial judge’s general 
“gatekeeping” obligation—applies not only to testimony based on 
‘scientific’ knowledge, but also to testimony based on ‘technical’ and 
‘other specialized’ knowledge.”94  This holding left open the question 
of how this general gatekeeping obligation should be carried out for 
nonscientific expertise, an issue that the Court begins to address in 
Kumho Tire itself, and that has attracted a great deal of attention 
since. 
We start with a different question: Why is the expert testimony 
that was excluded in Daubert described as “scientific” (or at least, 
would-be scientific) evidence, and the expert testimony that was 
excluded in Kumho Tire as “nonscientific” evidence?  The evidence at 
issue in Daubert, as we know, was testimony by several qualified 
medical experts “that Bendectin can cause birth defects.”95  The 
evidence in Kumho Tire was testimony by a qualified engineer with 
experience as a tire failure consultant, that “a defect in its 
manufacture or design caused the blow-out” that led to the accident 
that was the basis for the lawsuit.96  What makes the evidence in 
Daubert “science” and that in Kumho Tire “nonscience”?  The 
distinction does not reflect a difference in the scientific bases of the 
two disciplines at issue.  As the Court notes in Kumho Tire, 
“[e]ngineering testimony rests upon scientific foundations . . .”; 
arguably, engineering is at least as scientific as medicine.97 
The difference, rather, is the nature of the issue the experts 
addressed.  The question in Daubert was general causation: Can this 
drug ever have the claimed effect?  Because it is a general issue it 
could be, and, as it happens, had been, systematically studied.  The 
question in Kumho Tire was the specific historical cause of a single 
accident: Why did this tire blow out when it did?  Science may 
provide us with tools (microscopes, reagents, etc.) to help answer that 
question by examining the remains, but the actual event cannot be 
 
 93 509 U.S. at 590 n.8. 
 94 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999). 
 95 509 U.S. at 583. 
 96 526 U.S. at 143. 
 97 Id. at 150. 
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replicated and studied systematically.  The main factual issue in 
Daubert was what to make of the thirty published epidemiological 
studies that had failed to find a relationship between Bendectin and 
birth defects.  That issue—in our terminology, a question of  fact 
instruction—is properly in the sphere of science.  The factual 
question in Kumho Tire was “whether the expert could reliably 
determine the cause of this tire’s separation” on the basis of visual 
inspection of the tire in question.98  That question—an issue of expert 
assessment—was a matter for practical judgment. 
There’s an irony here.  Although the “nonscientific” expertise in 
Kumho Tire came from an engineer, there is no doubt that the bulk of 
similar testimony comes from medical experts, the same category of 
witnesses who provided some of the prohibited “scientific” evidence 
in Daubert.  A majority of all witnesses in American trials are medical 
professionals—M.D.’s alone make up half of the total99—who testify 
primarily in personal injury trials of one sort or another.  The most 
common role for a medical witness is to offer an expert assessment of 
the medical status of an individual—her condition (diagnosis), or its 
causes, or her future prospects (prognosis).  These assessments are 
often nonscientific, practical clinical judgments in the same way that 
the engineer’s testimony in Kumho Tire was nonscientific.  The 
disputed expert testimony in Zuchowicz is a good illustration. 
As the Second Circuit points out, the nature of the issue of 
causation in Zuchowicz essentially precluded scientific evidence on 
causation: 
The rarity of PPH, combined with the fact that so few human 
beings have ever received such a high dose of Danocrine, 
obviously impacted on the manner in which the plaintiff could 
prove causation.  The number of persons who received this type 
of overdose was simply too small for the plaintiff to be able to 
provide epidemiological, or even anecdotal, evidence linking PPH 
to Danocrine overdoses.100 
Instead, one of the plaintiff’s experts, Dr. Tackett, offered a causal 
hypothesis: “Danocrine, more likely than not, caused PPH in the 
plaintiff by producing: 1) a decrease in estrogen; 2) 
hyperinsulinemia, in which abnormally high levels of insulin circulate 
in the body; and 3) increases in free testosterone and 
progesterone.”101  The conclusion of Dr. Matthay, the plaintiff’s 
 
 98 Id. at 154 (emphasis omitted). 
 99 Gross, supra note 25, at 1119; Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: 
Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 31-32 (1996). 
 100 Zuchowicz, 140 F.3d at 385. 
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second expert on causation, “was based on the temporal relationship 
between the overdose and the start of the disease and the differential 
etiology method of excluding other possible causes.”102 
There may be nothing wrong with Dr. Tackett’s hypothesis, but 
that’s all it is—an untested hypothesis.  The hypothesis itself was quite 
possibly reasonable,103 and if Dr. Tackett had said that this was a 
possible cause of Mrs. Zuchowicz’s illness, that would have been a 
plausible scientific statement.  Instead, he testified “to a reasonable 
degree of scientific certainty” that it was “more likely than not” that 
this theoretical process had the effect he hypothesized, and, even 
more specifically, that it was more likely than not that the overdose 
caused the disease.104  This language may have been necessary to meet 
the substantive legal requirements of the plaintiff’s malpractice claim, 
but asserting, with that level of confidence, that an untested 
hypothesis is true in general, and explains a particular event, is not 
science.  Dr. Tackett inferred too much on the basis of too little. 
Dr. Matthay’s testimony sticks closer to an accepted expert 
methodology: differential diagnosis.  But it too is not science.  
Treating physicians must make judgments about the nature and 
causes of their patients’ pathologies even when they only have limited 
information, just as judges and juries must make decisions about 
disputed facts.  In the process, doctors (like courts) gather the best 
information they can—scientific and nonscientific—consider the 
range of plausible theories, and try to exclude as many as possible.  
This is probably the best they can do.  It may have been reasonable, 
for example, to conclude that an overdose of Danocrine might have 
caused Mrs. Zuchowicz’s PPH.  That may have been the best educated 
guess a treating physician could produce; it may have justified a 
therapeutic decision.  But in the absence of any other evidence that 
Danocrine has ever had this effect, the temporal coincidence 
between the overdose and the disease in this one case cannot justify a 
high degree of certainty that the former caused the latter.  Dr. 
Matthay’s testimony—like much medical testimony based on sound 
clinical medicine—is far closer to the “nonscientific” expertise in 
Kumho Tire than to the “scientific” expert evidence in Daubert.  But 
the problem with this testimony, insofar as there is one, is not that it 
is not science; it is, once again, the excessive confidence with which 
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 103 As the trial court notes, another one of the plaintiff’s experts deemed the 
theory “very plausible.”  Zuchowicz, 870 F. Supp. at 20.  Obviously questions of 
partisan solidarity—a form of bias—arise when assessing the weight due to 
corroboration by another expert testifying for the same side. 
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the expert’s assessment is pronounced. 
The expert testimony in Zuchowicz was controversial because of 
the unanswered underlying question of general causation: Can 
Danocrine, or an overdose of Danocrine, ever cause PPH?  This 
question—a matter that is subject of general expert instruction—is of 
the sort than could in theory be studied and answered scientifically, 
although in this instance that might be exceedingly difficult.  The 
district court admitted the testimony over objection, and the circuit 
court affirmed, essentially on the theory that the plaintiff was 
presenting the best expert testimony available.  Given the discretion 
conferred by the Supreme Court in Joiner, a different trial court could 
have done the opposite and also have been affirmed.105  In Joiner itself, 
for example, the trial court excluded specific expert assessments that 
exposure to PCBs promoted the plaintiff’s lung cancer for lack of 
evidence on general causation: “Plaintiffs have failed to show by a 
preponderance of proof that their experts’ opinions regarding the 
PCB/lung cancer link are admissible under the standards set out in 
Rule 702 and explicated in Daubert.”106 
In many cases, there is no dispute about general causation.  
Everybody agrees that exposure to asbestos can cause lung cancer.  
But did asbestos cause the lung cancer that killed a particular 
plaintiff—a fifty-eight year-old worker, for example, who was exposed 
to a moderate amount of asbestos and who smoked a pack of 
cigarettes a day since the age of 16?  In that situation the only 
disputed issue is one of clinical judgment.  In the usual case, each 
side will present one or more qualified doctors who will testify that 
asbestos did or did not cause the disease, and the opposing party will 
not even bother to object. 
We do not mean to say that assessments of specific causation are 
inherently “nonscientific.”  The terminology is the Supreme Court’s, 
not ours.  In some cases the cause of a person’s disease can be 
determined with a high degree of confidence.  Extensive studies have 
shown that the vast majority, if not all cases of mesothelioma—a rare 
cancer of the lining of the chest, abdominal cavity, or heart—are 
caused by exposure to asbestos.  Given that body of “scientific” 
 
 105 There are no other reported cases regarding a causal relation between 
Danocrine and PPH.  For an example of a disputed issue of causation on which 
courts are currently reaching contradictory conclusions about admissibility under 
Daubert, see Mark Hansen, “When Expert Testimony Fails the Test: District Courts Disagree 
on what Defines Causation Evidence in Drug Disability Cases,” 88 A.B.A. J. 22 (2002) 
(examining the cases considering whether Parlodel, an anti-lactation drug, causes 
stroke, and finding that plaintiff’s causation evidence has been excluded under 
Daubert in half of the cases and permitted in the other half). 
 106 Joiner, 864 F. Supp. at 1326. 
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knowledge, an expert could assert with a high degree of confidence 
that the mesothelioma suffered by a particular patient was caused by 
exposure to asbestos.  And advances in science may improve the 
ability of experts to determine the cause of a patient’s illness in 
harder cases.  New tests could perhaps be developed that will detect 
subtle morphological differences between lung cancer caused by 
asbestos and lung cancer caused by smoking.  Our point rather is that 
doctors and other experts must regularly make judgments of this sort 
with limited information.  When experts render opinions in the face 
of great uncertainty, we should recognize both their expertise and its 
limits. 
In our culture, science is the dominant method for answering 
general factual questions: Does the consumption of trans-fatty acids 
increase the risk of heart disease?  Can earthquakes be predicted by 
observing the behavior of animals?  What is the relationship between 
confidence and accuracy for eyewitness identifications of strangers?  
Does Bendectin cause birth defects?  When experts claim to be able 
to address these questions—to provide general factual instruction—
courts should require an appropriate relation between the evidence 
supporting their claim and the degree of confidence asserted.  In 
many cases the best scientific answer is uncertainty: It’s likely, it’s 
possible, it’s plausible, it’s unlikely—but in any event, we don’t know. 
The capacity to recognize and acknowledge uncertainty and to 
postpone judgment is an essential element of scientific inquiry.  This 
is a luxury that does not extend to trials, however, or to any other 
situation in which decisions about particular cases must be made.  
Doctor, engineers, investigators, judges and juries all must decide 
how to act on particular facts in the face uncertainty.  There is 
nothing illegitimate about a doctor’s decision to recommend 
radiation treatment instead of chemotherapy to a cancer patient, 
even though an equally competent colleague down the hall would 
have done the opposite.  Scientific studies may frame the issue and 
narrow the options, but if they do not provide a clear answer to a 
question that cannot be put off the doctor will have to do her best by 
other means: rely on anecdotal data, reason by analogy, or play a 
hunch.  By the same token, it makes perfect sense for courts to listen 
to expert evidence about specific factual assessments—the diagnosis 
of a patient’s disease or the cause of an accident—even though 
assessments are not in themselves scientific statements.  If similar 
assessments are used to decide how to treat patients or design tires, 
courts should be willing to listen. 
From a scientific point of view, the main danger of specific 
assessments based on limited information is overconfidence.  To 
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some extent, this danger may be inherent in the process of making 
decisions, especially difficult and important ones: those of us who are 
not plagued by self-doubt tend to become committed to our choices, 
however arbitrary.  A doctor who prefers radiation to chemotherapy 
for idiosyncratic reasons may come to believe, and tell others, that it 
is far superior.  The use of partisan experts magnifies this effect.  
Lawyers are likely to encourage their expert witnesses to talk in 
strong, unambiguous terms and to choose those experts who are 
likely to do so anyway or willing to take direction.  The oncologist 
who says the plaintiff’s lung cancer was “clearly caused by asbestos” 
may be hired by the plaintiff; the one who says it was “clearly caused 
by smoking” may be hired by the defendant; but the doctor who says 
“it looks like ____, but it’s hard to tell” will never appear in court, 
regardless of how he fills in the blank.  In addition, as we have seen, 
the substantive law governing the claim may provide an additional 
push for the expert to testify that a theory that is reasonable and 
plausible, but utterly uncertain, is “more likely than not” “to a 
reasonable degree of scientific certainty.” 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
American evidence law consists primarily of objections to the 
admission of evidence, so most judicial and academic discussions of 
expert evidence focus on admissibility.  In the wake of Daubert, the 
central issues have been the validity of expert evidence, and to a 
lesser degree the competence of expert witnesses—both of which can 
pose problems for admissibility—rather than the bias of expert 
witnesses or the clarity of their testimony, which are almost always 
said to go to the weight of the evidence.  This is a narrow point of 
view.  For most uses of expert evidence, across topics and fields, 
admissibility is not a problem.  The great majority of experts who are 
called are deemed competent to testify—“qualified”—without 
opposition.  Many types of expert evidence are routinely admitted 
without explicit consideration of their validity; and in the uncommon 
cases in which the validity of expert testimony is genuinely disputed, 
exclusion is often not the best remedy. 
We have tried to explore the entire assorted range of expert 
evidence that is offered in court, and the full range of issues it 
presents, by developing a taxonomy of expert information.  We hope 
this scheme has some value; we know that it is a preliminary and 
incomplete effort.  For the most part, we give a descriptive account of 
those uses of expert evidence that we discuss.  We do, however, have a 
few general recommendations.  We do not mean to imply that these 
ideas are original, or that courts do not (sometimes) act on them.  
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We intend rather to salute those who do and encourage those who as 
yet do not. 
First, attend in detail to the content of expert evidence.  Expert 
witnesses may make many different types of statements.  Their 
testimony will frequently blend observation, description and 
assessment.  Even when part of their testimony is insufficiently 
reliable, other portions may be admissible.  Most qualified experts 
who are called at trial probably have something to say that the jury 
should be allowed to hear, even if it is not everything the proponent 
wants to offer.  In deciding on the admissibility of expert evidence, 
courts should focus on the actual statements the experts intend to 
make, and exclude only those that are for one reason or another 
inadmissible, rather than thinking of the expert’s testimony as a unit 
that stands or falls in its entirety.  And in evaluating expert evidence 
that is before them, courts should likewise focus on the separate 
statements rather than the testimony as a whole, and make use of 
what is reliable and valuable. 
Second, pay special attention to the level of confidence the expert 
witness expresses.  In Daubert itself the problem was categorical.  By 
1989, the claim that Bendectin causes human birth defects was simply 
bad science: there had been “more than 30 published studies involving 
over 130,000 patients,” none of which “demonstrated a statistically 
significant association between Bendectin and birth defects.”107  To 
assert the opposite, given the strength of the available evidence, was 
simply not scientifically plausible.  More often, however, the real 
problem with questionable expert testimony is less extreme, that the 
expert witness has expressed an unjustified degree of confidence.  In 
Zuchowicz, for example, it would have been perfectly reasonable to 
conclude that the plaintiff’s primary pulmonary hypertension might 
have been caused by an overdose of Danocrine.  That would not have 
been a scientific conclusion—there was too much uncertainty to justify 
a confident conclusion about causation—but it would have been a 
plausible hypothesis, a clinical judgment on which a doctor or perhaps 
even a court might reasonably act, especially given the lack of better 
information.  Unfortunately, the informational value of that sort of 
hypothesis in court is often degraded when it is described as a fact, or 
even when it is said to be “probable” or “likely” for no better reason 
than that the party calling the expert would like that statement to be 
heard.  What could be modest but useful expert evaluation is 
transformed into misleading pseudo-science. 
All of us—doctors, lawyers, teachers, judges—are prone to 
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exaggerate.  It would be reassuring if this tendency were mitigated in 
the solemn precincts of our courts, if witnesses and advocates spoke 
with unusually measured care.  For experts at least, the truth is 
probably exactly the opposite.  Confidence and certainty are traits 
that lawyers seek when they choose experts—and traits they try to 
instill as they prepare them for trial—because they are understood to 
be effective.  Worse, in many cases substantive rules of law require 
expert witnesses to phrase their testimony in terms of a specified level 
of confidence.  It is no accident that Dr. Tackett testified “to a 
reasonable degree of scientific certainty” that it was “more likely than 
not” that Mrs. Zuchowicz’s death was caused by an overdose of 
Danocrine; he was required to do so.  It may be perfectly reasonable 
for courts to decide as a matter of law some questions that turn on 
expert evidence, and to take those issues—or the entire cases—away 
from the jury.  But there is nothing to be gained from rules that 
distort the evidence that goes into the process, or that require 
talismanic language that creates special incentives for experts to 
exaggerate.  The experts we call as witnesses will provide better 
information if we do not encourage them to speak with excessive 
confidence in order to be heard at all.  After they are heard, it may 
make sense to reject the claims they address by finding insufficient 
evidence in support as a matter of law—but that judgment should be 
made on the basis of the best expert evidence we can get, not the 
most pliable. 
Finally, look after the adversarial system.  We insist on using 
partisan, adversarial expertise in court almost exclusively.  There are 
other ways to make use of expert information in litigation—perhaps 
better ones—but this is ours.  As long as we do depend on the 
adversarial system, we need to have one that actually is what it claims 
to be: a contest with two sides, where each serves as a check on the 
other.  In many criminal cases, there is only one side on expert issues: 
the prosecution.  The result is a national scandal.  We have seen case 
after case of systematic fraud and incompetence by prosecution 
experts and police crime laboratories, with no end in sight.  Daubert 
and the cases following it were civil cases; the problems they address 
limit the efficiency of our system of civil litigation, and may result in 
erroneous judgments at trials where money damages are at stake.  
The abuses that have been discovered in the use of experts in 
criminal prosecutions call into question the integrity of our system of 
determining the guilt or innocence for the most serious crimes, and 
have produced false convictions that have destroyed the lives of many 
innocent defendants. 
 
